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Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Fochmann
  • Björn Jahnke
  • Andreas Wagener

Abstract

Reliable institutions, i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep foster cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that ‘the system’ had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that learned that attempts only did not affect their payoffs or that were not exposed to corruption at all.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Fochmann & Björn Jahnke & Andreas Wagener, 2019. "Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 66(3), pages 434-458, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:66:y:2019:i:3:p:434-458
    DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12197
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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Morale and public goods: some unsurprising research
      by Nicholas Gruen in Club Troppo on 2017-03-12 16:27:55

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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