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An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption:

  • Viceisza, Angelino

"This study reports theory-testing laboratory experiments on the effect of yardstick competition on corruption. The results reveal that on the incumbent's side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism only if the incumbent politician is female. On the voter's side, voters focus on the difference between the tax rate in their own jurisdiction versus that in another jurisdiction. If the voters' tax rate is deemed unfair compared to that in the other jurisdiction, voters are less likely to re-elect. These findings support the claim by Besley and Case (1995) that incumbent behavior and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition, suggesting that our laboratory experiments have some external validity." from Author's Abstract

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Paper provided by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in its series IFPRI discussion papers with number 774.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:fpr:ifprid:774
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  1. Timothy Besley & Michael Smart, 2005. "Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 06, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  2. Potters, Jan & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & van Damme, Eric, 2004. "Collusion under yardstick competition: an experimental study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1017-1038, September.
  3. Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Laboratory experiments on corruption," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-38, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  4. Dilip Mookherjee & Pranab Bardhan, 2005. "Decentralization, Corruption And Government Accountability: An Overview," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-023, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Jun 2005.
  5. Miller, Ross M & Plott, Charles R, 1985. "Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 837-72, July.
  6. Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  7. Browning, Edgar K, 1976. "The Marginal Cost of Public Funds," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(2), pages 283-98, April.
  8. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-141666 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-302954 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
  11. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, 2007. "What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 153-174, Spring.
  12. Libor Dušek & Andreas Ortman & Lubomír Lízal, 2005. "Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility Through Experiments," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2005(2), pages 147-162.
  13. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World; Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Working Papers 98/63, International Monetary Fund.
  14. repec:dgr:kubcen:200397 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Potters, J.J.M. & Sefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2007. "Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games : An experimental study," Other publications TiSEM 1ea4e6c8-3071-46d8-a29f-0, School of Economics and Management.
  16. Paul Belleflamme & Jean Hindriks, 2005. "Yardstick competition and political agency problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 155-169, 09.
  17. Smith, Vernon L, 1989. "Theory, Experiment and Economics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 151-69, Winter.
  18. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  19. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages F632-F652, November.
  20. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  21. Brit Grosskopf & Rajiv Sarin, 2010. "Is Reputation Good or Bad? An Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2187-2204, December.
  22. Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "A Note on the Hybrid Equilibrium in the Besley-Smart Model," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 727, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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