An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption:
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- Angelino Viceisza, 2007. "An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2007-09, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsCorruption; Yardstick competition; Political agency; Asymmetric and private information; Experiments; Social protection; Institutions;
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-08-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-COM-2008-08-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2008-08-06 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2008-08-06 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2008-08-06 (Public Economics)
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