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Citations for "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion"

by Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima

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  1. Obara, Ichiro, 2009. "Folk theorem with communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 120-134, January.
  2. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1236, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 8896226, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6102 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  6. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Matthias Lang, 2012. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Mar 2014.
  8. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2010. "Plausible Cooperation,Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2012.
  9. Gerlach, Heiko, 2009. "Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 655-666, November.
  10. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
  11. Harrison Cheng, 2000. "Folk Theorem with One-sided Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 338-363, April.
  12. Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January.
  13. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, David K. Levine.
  14. Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000081, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000577, UCLA Department of Economics.
  16. Ichiro Obara, . "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case," CARESS Working Papres 99-13, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  17. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  18. Dellarocas, Chrysanthos, 2003. "Efficiency and Robustness of Binary Feedback Mechanisms in Trading Environments with Moral Hazard," Working papers 4297-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  19. Ichiro Obara, . "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 399, UCLA Department of Economics.
  20. Pavlo Prokopovych & Lones Smith, 2004. "Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 287, Econometric Society.
  21. Heidhues, Paul & Rady, Sven & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Strategic experimentation with private payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 531-551.
  22. Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 174-192, January.
  23. Genesove, David & Mullin, Wallace P, 2001. "Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case," CEPR Discussion Papers 2739, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  24. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1961, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  25. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2004. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 736, Econometric Society.
  26. Heller, Yuval, 2015. "Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring," MPRA Paper 64468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  27. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
  28. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  29. Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  30. Julian Romero, 2011. "Finite Automata in Undiscounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1260, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  31. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-97, October.
  32. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 106-150, January.
  33. V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA.
  34. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2015. "Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 188-211.
  35. William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," Game Theory and Information 0511007, EconWPA.
  36. Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006. "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics.
  37. Laclau, M., 2013. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 332-337.
  38. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Working Papers gueconwpa~07-07-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  39. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000342, UCLA Department of Economics.
  40. David Spector, 2015. "Facilitating collusion by exchanging non-verifiable sales reports," PSE Working Papers halshs-01119959, HAL.
  41. Hasker, Kevin, 2000. "Social Norms and Choice: A Weak Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games," Working Papers 2000-10, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  42. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015. "Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
  43. David A. Miller, 2012. "Robust Collusion with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 778-811.
  44. Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 275, UCLA Department of Economics.
  45. Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June.
  46. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2007. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," 2007 Meeting Papers 751, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  47. Zhongmin Wang, 2008. "Collusive Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline Market," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 35-52, February.
  48. Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2004. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  49. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-242, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  50. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000079, www.najecon.org.
  51. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  52. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2010. "A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences," MPRA Paper 38389, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  53. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 2003. "Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 227-250, August.
  54. Andrew Postlewaite & Olivier Compte, 2008. "Repeated Relationships with Limits on Information Processing," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-026, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  55. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
  56. Leibbrandt, Andreas & Sääksvuori, Lauri, 2012. "Communication in intergroup conflicts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1136-1147.
  57. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  58. W. Bentley MacLeod & Teck Yong Tan, 2016. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation: The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile," NBER Working Papers 22156, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  59. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
  60. Li, Rui, 2010. "Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 322-326, September.
  61. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-84, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  62. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
  63. Nolan Miller & Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, 2005. "Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(9), pages 1359-1373, September.
  64. Johannes H�rner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Working Papers 1397, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  65. Luís Cabral, 2005. "Collusion Theory: Where to Go Next?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 199-206, December.
  66. Liliane Karlinger, 2008. "How Demand Information Can Destabilize a Cartel," Vienna Economics Papers 0803, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  67. Lucie Ménager, 2015. "Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden," Working Papers hal-00856078, HAL.
  68. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
  69. Robert Gibbons, 2005. "Incentives Between Firms (and Within)," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(1), pages 2-17, January.
  70. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics.
  71. Petrikaitė, Vaiva, 2016. "Collusion with costly consumer search," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-10.
  72. Kandori Michihiro, 2003. "Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 345-353, January.
  73. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1237, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  74. Masaki Aoyagi, 2002. "Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication," ISER Discussion Paper 0566, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  75. Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Wallis Working Papers WP34, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  76. Joseph E. Harrington & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011. "Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2425-49, October.
  77. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2012. "Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1998-2027.
  78. David Rahman, 2014. "The Power of Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3737-51, November.
  79. Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  80. Fuentelsaz, Lucio & Gómez, Jaime & Palomas, Sergio, 2016. "Interdependences in the intrafirm diffusion of technological innovations: Confronting the rational and social accounts of diffusion," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(5), pages 951-963.
  81. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13637 is not listed on IDEAS
  82. repec:pra:mprapa:64485 is not listed on IDEAS
  83. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
  84. Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
  85. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  86. Zhang, Wenzhang & Chan, Jimmy H., 2016. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
  87. M Laclau, 2012. "Local Communication in Repeated Games with Local Monitoring," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
  88. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2015. "Plausible cooperation," Post-Print halshs-01204780, HAL.
  89. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January.
  90. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2000. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1036, Econometric Society.
  91. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  92. Kandori, Michihiro, 2002. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-15, January.
  93. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
  94. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2016. "On Communication and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 285-315, February.
  95. Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004. "Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
  96. Mouraviev, Igor, 2006. "Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication," Working Paper Series 672, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  97. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Muriel Niederle & Josef Perktold, 2000. "Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1482, Econometric Society.
  98. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, 2010. "Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Working Paper Archive 559, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  99. Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
  100. Zheng, Bingyong, 2008. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 406-416, May.
  101. Harrington, Joseph E. & Zhao, Wei, 2012. "Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 277-289.
  102. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  103. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
  104. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
  105. Markus Kinateder, 2006. "Repeated Games Played in a Network," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 674.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  106. Thijssen, J.J.J., 2003. "Investment under uncertainty, market evolution and coalition spillovers in a game theoretic perspective," Other publications TiSEM 672073a6-492e-4621-8d4a-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  107. Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  108. Bentley MacLeod, 2001. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000036, UCLA Department of Economics.
  109. George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2008.
  110. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January.
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