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Randomization, Communication and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

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  • Michihiro Kandori

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

Abstract

The present paper shows that the Folk Theorem under imperfect (public) information (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994)) can be obtained under much weaker set of assumptions, if we allow communication among players. Our results in particular show that for generic symmetric games with at least four players, we can drop the FLM condition on the number of actions and signals altogether and prove the folk theorem under the same condition as in the perfect monitoring case.

Suggested Citation

  • Michihiro Kandori, 2001. "Randomization, Communication and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-139, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  • Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf139
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August.
    2. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, March.
    3. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 13, pages 275-307, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem With Imperfect Public Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 12, pages 231-273, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 311-336, November.
    7. Olivier Compte, 1998. "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 597-626, May.
    8. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay, 2019. "Communication and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    2. Konishi, Hideki, 2005. "Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 235-261, March.
    3. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, March.
    4. Li, Rui, 2010. "Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 322-326, September.
    5. Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
    6. Sushil Bikhchandani & Ichiro Obara, 2017. "Mechanism design with information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 783-812, March.
    7. Markus Kinateder, 2006. "Repeated Games Played in a Network," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 674.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    8. Jullien, Bruno & Park, In-Uck, 2019. "Communication, Feedbacks and Repeated Moral Hazard with Short-lived Buyers," TSE Working Papers 19-1027, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2020.
    9. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2016. "Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 311-323.

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