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Oil Prices, Cartels, and the Problem of Dynamic Inconsistency

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  1. Yelena Kalyuzhnova & Michael Kaser, 2006. "Prudential Management of Hydrocarbon Revenues in Resource-rich Transition Economies," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 167-187.
  2. Groot, Fons & Withagen, Cees & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2000. "Open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-vs.-fringe model," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 209-223, April.
  3. Ramcharran, Harri, 2001. "OPEC's production under fluctuating oil prices: further test of the target revenue theory," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 667-681, November.
  4. Benchekroun, Hassan & Halsema, Alex & Withagen, Cees, 2009. "On nonrenewable resource oligopolies: The asymmetric case," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(11), pages 1867-1879, November.
  5. Vierhaus, Ingmar & van Veldhuizen, Roel & Fügenschuh, Armin, 2017. "Strategic Uncertainty in Markets for Nonrenewable Resources: A Level-k Approach," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 1-8.
  6. Matti Liski & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2005. "A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 159-173, June.
  7. Benchekroun, Hassan & van der Meijden, Gerard & Withagen, Cees, 2020. "OPEC, unconventional oil and climate change - On the importance of the order of extraction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
  8. Ramcharran, Harri, 2002. "Oil production responses to price changes: an empirical application of the competitive model to OPEC and non-OPEC countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 97-106, March.
  9. Andrade de Sá, Saraly & Daubanes, Julien, 2016. "Limit pricing and the (in)effectiveness of the carbon tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 28-39.
  10. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2019. "Stackelberg versus Cournot: A differential game approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 239-261.
  11. Frederick van der Ploeg, 2011. "Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 366-420, June.
  12. Benchekroun, Hassan & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 355-374.
  13. Hassan Benchekroun & Gerard C. van der Meijden & Cees A. Withagen, 2017. "OPEC, Shale Oil, and Global Warming - On the Importance of the Order of Extraction," CESifo Working Paper Series 6746, CESifo.
  14. Bazhanov, Andrei, 2006. "Decreasing of Oil Extraction: Consumption behavior along transition paths," MPRA Paper 469, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Gvozdeva, Margarita (Гвоздева, Маргарита) & Kazakova, M.V. (Казакова, М.В.) & Kiblitskaya, T.R. (Киблицкая, Т.Р.) & Lyubimov, I.L. (Любимов, И.Л.) & Nesterova, K.V. (Нестерова, К.В.), 2016. "Various Aspects of Natural Resource Wealth Effect on Economic Growth [Различные Аспекты Влияния Богатства Природными Ресурсами На Экономический Рост]," Working Papers 2045, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
  16. Genc, Talat S., 2017. "OPEC and demand response to crude oil prices," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 238-246.
  17. Benchekroun, Hassan & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 355-374.
  18. Margaret S. McMillan & Andrew R. Waxman, 2007. "Profit Sharing Between Governments and Multinationals in Natural Resource Extraction: Evidence From a Firm-Level Panel," NBER Working Papers 13332, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Matti Liski & Juan‐Pablo Montero, 2011. "Market Power in an Exhaustible Resource Market: The Case of Storable Pollution Permits," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(551), pages 116-144, March.
  20. Roel van Veldhuizen & Joep Sonnemans, 2018. "Nonrenewable Resources, Strategic Behavior and the Hotelling Rule: An Experiment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 481-516, June.
  21. Wan, Rui & Boyce, John R., 2014. "Non-renewable resource Stackelberg games," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 102-121.
  22. Karp, Larry S. & Tahvonen, Olli, 1995. "International Trade in Exhaustible Resources: A Cartel-Competitive Fringe Model," CUDARE Working Papers 6303, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  23. Juan Pablo Montero & Matti Liski, 2003. "Is it Possible to Move the Copper Market?," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(121), pages 559-565.
  24. Bonacina, Monica & Gulli`, Francesco, 2007. "Electricity pricing under "carbon emissions trading": A dominant firm with competitive fringe model," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(8), pages 4200-4220, August.
  25. Pollitt, M. G., 2024. "David Michael Garrood Newbery (1943-)," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2442, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  26. Benchekroun, Hassan & Gaudet, Gerard & Van Long, Ngo, 2006. "Temporary natural resource cartels," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 663-674, November.
  27. Cees Withagen, 1998. "Untested Hypotheses in Non-Renewable Resource Economics," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 623-634, April.
  28. Jaakkola, Niko, 2019. "Carbon taxation, OPEC and the end of oil," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 101-117.
  29. Sven M. Flakowski, 2004. "Formulating and Solving Exhaustible Resource Models as Mixed Complementarity Problems in GAMS," Computers in Higher Education Economics Review, Economics Network, University of Bristol, vol. 16(1), pages 18-25.
  30. Gérard Gaudet, 2007. "Natural resource economics under the rule of Hotelling," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1033-1059, November.
  31. Groot, Fons & Withagen, Cees & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2003. "Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 287-306, November.
  32. Giraud, Pierre-Noel, 1995. "The equilibrium price range of oil : Economics, politics and uncertainty in the formation of oil prices," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 35-49, January.
  33. Behnaz Minooei Fard & Willi Semmler & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2023. "Rare Earth Elements: A game between China and the rest of the world," Working Papers in Public Economics 235, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
  34. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2018. "Consumer surplus-enhancing cooperation in a natural resource oligopoly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 185-193.
  35. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
  36. Zili Yang, 2013. "Is the Leading Role Desirable?: A Simulation Analysis of the Stackelberg Behavior in World Petroleum Market," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(1), pages 133-150, June.
  37. Andrade de Sá, Saraly & Daubanes, Julien, 2016. "Limit pricing and the (in)effectiveness of the carbon tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 28-39.
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