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David Michael Garrood Newbery (1943-)

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  • Pollitt, M. G.

Abstract

David Newbery is one of the very best micro-economists that Cambridge has produced in recent decades. David has made many contributions to economics over the years, in development economics, public economics, industrial organization, economic regulation, transport and energy economics. We discuss his work in three general parts. The first focuses on his early work. This includes his work with Nobel Laureate, Joe Stiglitz, on commodity price stabilisation, with Richard Gilbert on patenting and with Nicholas Stern on taxation in developing countries. The second looks at his work on the pricing of transport and energy, particularly with respect to efficient road pricing and optimal energy taxation. This includes work with Nobel Laureate, Eric Maskin, and Larry Karp. The final part reviews his work on liberalised electricity market design, both in terms of the operation of wholesale electricity markets and the regulation of network monopolies.

Suggested Citation

  • Pollitt, M. G., 2024. "David Michael Garrood Newbery (1943-)," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2442, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:2442
    Note: mgp20
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Newbery, D., 2005. "Why Tax Energy? Towards a More Rational Energy Policy," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0508, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 460-501, June.
    3. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-278, June.
    4. repec:aen:journl:dn-se-a02 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Newbery, David M, 1990. "Pricing and Congestion: Economic Principles Relevant to Pricing Roads," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 6(2), pages 22-38, Summer.
    6. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I--Production Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 8-27, March.
    7. Richard Gilbert & Karsten Neuhoff & David Newbery, 2004. "Allocating Transmission to Mitigate Market Power in Electricity Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 691-709, Winter.
    8. Richard J. Gilbert & David M. Newbery, 1994. "The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(4), pages 538-554, Winter.
    9. Newbery, David M G, 1981. "Oil Prices, Cartels, and the Problem of Dynamic Inconsistency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(363), pages 617-646, September.
    10. repec:aen:journl:1992v13-02-a03 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Leroy P. Jones & Pankaj Tandon & Ingo Vogelsang, 1990. "Selling Public Enterprises: A Cost/Benefit Methodology," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262600625, December.
    12. repec:aen:journl:dn-se-a04 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Newbery, David M., 2002. "Problems of liberalising the electricity industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 919-927, May.
    14. David M. Newbery, 1998. "Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 726-749, Winter.
    15. Larry Karp & David M. Newbery, 1992. "Dynamically Consistent Oil Import Tariffs," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-21, February.
    16. David M. G. Newbery, 1977. "Risk Sharing, Sharecropping and Uncertain Labour Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 585-594.
    17. Newbery, David M, 1988. "Road Damage Externalities and Road User Charges," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 295-316, March.
    18. Maskin, Eric S & Newbery, David M, 1990. "Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 143-156, March.
    19. Newbery, David M., 1997. "Privatisation and liberalisation of network utilities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 357-383, April.
    20. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    21. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-526, June.
    22. Newbery, David, 1970. "A theorem on the measurement of inequality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 264-266, September.
    23. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
    24. repec:aen:journl:2005v26-03-a01 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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