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Profit Sharing Between Governments and Multinationals in Natural Resource Extraction: Evidence From a Firm-Level Panel

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  • Margaret S. McMillan
  • Andrew R. Waxman

Abstract

The "fairness" of negotiations between countries and resource extracting firms is subject to many accusations and counter-accusations and may be argued, in many instances, to impact the subsequent economic benefit to a host country from extraction. This paper examines the role of host country governance on the share of government take from extraction revenue. We attempt to disentangle a number of competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between governance and government take using panel data for US resource extracting multinational corporations (MNCs) operating abroad from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce over 1982-1999. Using fixed effects regression, we find a statistically significant positive impact of institutional quality on government take. The nature of this relationship -- whether this represents the result of a "corruption premium" paid by US MNCs or the exploitation of poor governance in negotiating government take -- is not completely clear. The evidence presented does, however, indicate that potential forms of bargaining power other than institutional quality (e.g., outside options to the deal) do increase government take, indicating that bargaining power may nonetheless be an important factor.

Suggested Citation

  • Margaret S. McMillan & Andrew R. Waxman, 2007. "Profit Sharing Between Governments and Multinationals in Natural Resource Extraction: Evidence From a Firm-Level Panel," NBER Working Papers 13332, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13332
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13332.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert J. Barro, 1998. "Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522543, January.
    2. Helliwell, John F., 1994. "Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(02), pages 225-248, April.
    3. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-11, February.
    4. Newbery, David M, 1992. "The Open-Loop von Stackelberg Equilibrium in the Cartel versus Fringe Model: A Reply," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(415), pages 1485-1487, November.
    5. Newbery, David M G, 1981. "Oil Prices, Cartels, and the Problem of Dynamic Inconsistency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(363), pages 617-646, September.
    6. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "Corruption, composition of capital flows, and currency crises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2429, The World Bank.
    7. Adelman, M. A., 1991. "User cost in oil production," Resources and Energy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 217-240, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Rohner, Dominic, 2012. "War and natural resource exploitation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1714-1729.
    2. Hajzler, Christopher, 2014. "Resource-based FDI and expropriation in developing economies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 124-146.
    3. Di Corato, Luca, 2013. "Profit sharing under the threat of nationalization," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 295-315.
    4. Restrepo, Diana & Correia, Ricardo & Población, Javier, 2012. "Political risk and corporate investment decisions," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 13114, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

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