Is it Possible to Move the Copper Market
We study whether and to what a large supplier facing a competitive fringe could effectively move the market of a depletable stock such as copper. We argue that the mere possibility for the large stockholder (i.e., leader) to sign forward contracts significantly reduces its market power. We show, for example, that in a three-period setting the leader has no ability whatsoever to move the market.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published as "Is it Possible to Move the Copper Market?", Cuadernos de Economía, Vol. 40, Nº 121, pp. 559-565, 2003.|
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- Newbery, David M G, 1981. "Oil Prices, Cartels, and the Problem of Dynamic Inconsistency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(363), pages 617-46, September.
- Butz, David A, 1990. "Durable-Good Monopoly and Best-Price Provisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1062-76, December.
- Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
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