Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2001

• Silvia Fedeli & Michele Santoni, 2001, "Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 2, issue 3, pages 203-229, November.
• Ramseyer, J Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B, 2001, "Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, volume 30, issue 1, pages 53-88, January, DOI: 10.1086/468111.
• Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, 2001, "Explaining Leakage of Public Funds," WIDER Working Paper Series, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER), number DP2001-147.
• Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2001, "Organized vs. competitive corruption," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 526, Jan, revised Nov 2001.
• Christian R. Ahlin, 2001, "Corruption: Political Determinants and Macroeconomic Effects," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, number 0126, Aug.
• Ranjana Mukherjee & Omer Gokcekus & Nick Manning & Pierre Landell-Mills, 2001, "Bangladesh : The Experience and Perceptions of Public Officials," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13861, ISBN: ARRAY(0x68126580), April.
• Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2001, "Explaining leakage of public funds," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2709, Nov.
• Helen Boss Heslop, 2001, "The Caspian States of the Former Soviet Union: Recent Economic Performance and Prospects in Light of the September Events," wiiw Country Profile, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw, number 16, Dec.
• James E. Rauch, 2001, "Leadership selection, internal promotion, and bureaucratic corruption in less developed polities," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, volume 34, issue 1, pages 240-258, February, DOI: 10.1111/0008-4085.00073.
• Inna Cabelkova, 2001, "Perceptions of Corruption in Ukraine: Are They Correct?," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0110004, Oct.
• Raelin, Joseph A., 2001, "Public Reflection as the Basis of Learning," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 32, issue 1, pages 11-30.

2000

• J. Atsu Amegashie, 2000, "A political economy model of immigration quotas," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, number dp00-19, revised 19 Sep 2000.
• Roland Hodler & Paul A. Raschky, 2010, "Foreign Aid and Enlightened Leaders," Working Papers, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee, number 10.05, Dec.
• Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000, "Corruption and competition in procurement," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 464, Mar, revised Mar 2001.
• Abbink, Klaus, 2000, "Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), number 1/2000.
• D. Gale Johnson, 2000, "Population, Food, and Knowledge," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 90, issue 1, pages 1-14, March.
• Thierry Verdier & Daron Acemoglu, 2000, "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 90, issue 1, pages 194-211, March.
• Alejandro Gaviria Uribe, 2000, "Assessing the effects of corruption and crime on firm performance," Informes de Investigación, Fedesarrollo, number 2031, Dec.
• Verdier, Thierry & Compte, Olivier & Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 2000, "Corruption And Competition In Public Market Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2434, Apr.
• Carrillo, Juan, 2000, "Try Me! On Job Assignments as a Screening Device," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2552, Sep.
• Compte, O. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. & Verdier, T., 2000, "Corruption and Competition in Public Market Auctions," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure), number 2000-01.
• TREPO, Georges X. & BALAZS, Katharina, 2000, "Deconstructing power and politics in organizations: Air France and the application of the ALSA method," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 715, Nov.
• Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 2000, "An Experimental Bribery Game," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society, number 1389, Aug.
• Chantal Kegels, 2000, "Working Paper 04-00 - La simplification des procédures administratives pesant sur les entreprises," Working Papers, Federal Planning Bureau, Belgium, number 200004, May.
• Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2000, "Corruption and Decentralization of Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development, number 104, Mar.
• Goldsmith, A.E., 2000, "Risk, Rule, and Reason in Africa," Equity and Growth through Economic Research, EAGER Publication/BHM, number 46.
• Sanyal, Amal & Gang, Ira N & Goswami, Omkar, 2000, "Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve," Public Choice, Springer, volume 105, issue 1-2, pages 61-78, October.
• Lippi, Francesco, 2000, "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism," Public Choice, Springer, volume 105, issue 3-4, pages 323-338, December.
• Michele Santoni & Silvia Fedeli, 2000, "Endogenous Institutions in Bureaucratic Compliance Games," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano, number 2000-003, Jan.
• Michele Santoni & Silvia Fedeli, 2000, "Endogenous Institutions in Bureaucratic Compliance Games," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano, number 2000-03, Jan.
• Gerald Marschke, 2000, "Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy," Discussion Papers, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics, number 00-09.

1999

• Francesco Lippi, 1999, "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 351, Apr.
• Bilin Neyapti & Secil Ozgur, 1999, "The Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Discipline on Budgetary Outcomes : The Case of the European Union," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Bilkent University, number 9906.
• Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 2000, "Competition and the Reform of Incentive Schemes in the Regulated Sector," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 2000s-58, Nov.
• Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999, "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 43, issue 4-6, pages 699-735, April.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1999, "Simultaneous evolution of learning rules and strategies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 40, issue 3, pages 295-312, November.
• Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999, "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 74, issue 3, pages 395-430, December.
• Fabio Giambiagi, 1999, "The “Institutional Building” in Brazil: a proposal," Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Center of Political Economy, volume 19, issue 2, pages 265-270.
• Lisa Barrow, 1999, "School choice through relocation: evidence from the Washington, D.C. area," Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, number WP-99-7.
• Lippi, F., 1999, "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatis," Papers, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi, number 351.
• Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, 1999, "Coase v. the Coasians," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1885.
• Dimaria, C.H. & Le Van, C., 1999, "Debt, Corruption, R&D and Growth in Developing Countries," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1999.36.
• Vai-Lam Mui, 1999, "Contracting in the Shadow of a Corrupt Court," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 155, issue 2, pages 249-249, June.
• Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, 1999, "Coase v. the Coasians," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 7447, Dec.
• Kenneth Mackenzie, 1999, "Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, volume 1, issue 1, pages 17-58, July-dece.
• Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 1999, "Corruption and the Hadleyburg effect," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 382, Apr.
• J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 1999, "Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?," Law and Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9907001, Jul.

1998

• Hyun Song Shin, 1998, "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, volume 29, issue 2, pages 378-405, Summer.
• Ira N. Gang & Amal Sanyal & Omkar Goswami, 1998, "Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 199604, Jul.
• Victor V. Claar, 1998, "An Incentive-Compatibility Approach To the Problem of Monitoring a Bureau," Public Finance Review, , volume 26, issue 6, pages 599-610, November, DOI: 10.1177/109114219802600605.
• Franz Wirl, 1998, "Socio-economic typologies of bureaucratic corruption and implications," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 8, issue 2, pages 199-220.
• Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 1998, "On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 4, pages 303-328.
• Huysman, Marleen & Newman, Mike, 1998, "Developing information systems in a turbulent environment: the case of the Dutch social security system," Serie Research Memoranda, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics, number 0006.
• Joseph Stiglitz, 1998, "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 2, pages 3-22, Spring.
• Bardhan, Pranab & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1998, "Expenditure Decentralization and the Delivery of Public Services in Developing Countries," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics, number 233623, Dec, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.233623.
• Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves da Silva, 1998, "The moral of public debt," Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Center of Political Economy, volume 18, issue 2, pages 241-259.
• Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1998, "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9809.
• Moshi, H.P.B., 1998, "Fiscal and Monetary Burden of Tanzania's Corporate Bodies: The Case of Public Enterprises," Papers, African Economic Research Consortium, number 75.
• Auriol, E., 1998, "Corruption in Procurement and Public Purchase," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 98a29.
• Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 1998, "Expenditure Decentralization and the Delivery of Public Services in Developing Countries," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development, number 90, Nov.
• Kneebone, R.D. & McKenzie, K.J., 1998, "Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: an Examination of Canadian Provinces," Papers, Calgary - Department of Economics, number 98-06.
• Leppamaki, M., 1998, "Non-Monetary Collusion and Optimal Use of Information," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics, Department of Economics, number 437.
• Rasmusen, E., 1998, "A Theory of Trustees, and Other Thoughts," Papers, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research, number 98-007.
• Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1998, "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies, number 658.
• Rainer Pappenheim, 1998, "Politische Rationalität und ökonomische Effizienz in der Haushaltspolitik," Working Paper Series B, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration, number 1998-11, Aug.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1998, "Simultaneous evolution of learning rules and strategies," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 98-46.
• Kessler, Daniel P & Piehl, Anne Morrison, 1998, "The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 14, issue 2, pages 256-276, October.
• Polterovich, Victor, 1998, "Corruption Factors," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 20958.

1997

• Galor, Oded & Tsiddon, Daniel, 1997, "Technological Progress, Mobility, and Economic Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 87, issue 3, pages 363-382, June.
• Shin, Hyun Song, 1997, "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1722, Oct.
• Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1997, "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure), number 97-06.
• Peter J. Quirk, 1997, "El blanqueo de dinero: repercusiones macroeconómicas," EKONOMIAZ. Revista vasca de Economía, Gobierno Vasco / Eusko Jaurlaritza / Basque Government, volume 39, issue 03, pages 187-195.
• Aintzane Izagirre Etxeberria, 1997, "Economía ilegal y de la corrupción," EKONOMIAZ. Revista vasca de Economía, Gobierno Vasco / Eusko Jaurlaritza / Basque Government, volume 39, issue 03, pages 196-223.
• Hagen, R.J., 1997, "Political Instability, Political Polarisation, and Public Sector Institutional Reforms," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 12/97.
• Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, 1997, "The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 6261, Nov.
• Federico Bonaglia & Jorge Braga de Macedo & Maurizio Bussolo, 2001, "How Globalisation Improves Governance," OECD Development Centre Working Papers, OECD Publishing, number 181, Nov, DOI: 10.1787/774554632487.
• Claar, Victor V, 1997, "An Incentive-Compatibility Approach to the Problem of Monitoring a Bureau," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 14240.
• John S. Earle & Saul Estrin, 1997, "Privatization Versus Competition: Changing Enterprise Behavior in Russia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan, number 70, Jan.
• Raelin, Joseph A., 1997, "Executive Professionalization and Executive Selection," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 20, issue 2, pages 16-27.
• Raelin, Joseph A., 1997, "Action learning and action science: Are they different?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, volume 26, issue 1, pages 21-34.

1996

• Kimya Kamshad, 1996, "The Dynamics of Firm Growth and Survival Under Alternative Forms of Control," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 3, issue 3, pages 331-341, DOI: 10.1080/758539570.
• Pranab Bardhan., 1996, "The Economics of Corruption in Less Developed Countries: A Review of Issues," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley, number C96-064, Feb.
• Susan Pozo (ed.), 1996, "Exploring the Underground Economy," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number eue, ISBN: ARRAY(0x6737d7c8).
• J.S. Earle & S. Estrin, 1996, "Privatization Versus Competition: Changing Enterprise Behavior in Russia," Working Papers, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, number wp96049, May.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1996, "Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 98-46, Jun.
• Bardhan, Pranab, 1996, "The Economics of Corruption in Less Developed Countries: A Review of Issues," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics, number 233426, Feb, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.233426.
• Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1996, "An Agenda For The Design And Study Of International Environmental Agreements," Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers, Utah State University, Economics Department, number 28353, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28353.
• McLaren, John, 1996, "Corruption, Black Markets, and the Fiscal Problem in LDC's: Some Recent Findings," Center Discussion Papers, Yale University, Economic Growth Center, number 28507, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28507.
• J Earle & S Estrin, 1996, "Privatisation versus Competition: Changing Enterprise Behavior in Russia," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, number dp0316, Dec.
• Leonardo Felli, 1996, "Preventing Collusion Through Discretion," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number /1996/303, Jan.
• Jesús Duarte, 1996, "La debilidad del Ministerio de Educación y la politización de la educación pública en Colombia: dos problemas a enfrentar en el Plan Decenal," Coyuntura Social, Fedesarrollo, number 13215, May.
• Batabyal, Amittrajeet A., 1996, "An agenda for the design and study of international environmental agreements," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, volume 19, issue 1, pages 3-9, October.
• John McLaren, 1996, "Corruption, Black Markets, and the Fiscal Problem in LDCs: Some Recent Findings," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, volume 22, issue 4, pages 491-502, Fall.
• Dexit, A. & Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1996, "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 11-96.
• Galor, O. & Tsiddon, D., 1996, "Technological Progress, Mobility and Economic Growth," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 13-96.

1995

• Rauch, James E, 1995, "Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S. Cities during the Progressive Era," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 85, issue 4, pages 968-979, September.
• von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995, "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 39, issue 3-4, pages 771-779, April.
• Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer & Rober Vishny, 1995, "Privatization in the United States," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1723.
• Prybyla, J.S., 1995, "The German Cure for Trabies and Lesser Ills," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics, number 11-95-11.
• Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 1995, "Indirect Monitoring and Optimal Corruption," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 52, Apr.
• Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1995, "Social Relations in the Workplace: a "Linked Games" Approach," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 76, Oct.
• James E. Rauch, 1995, "Choosing a Dictator: Bureaucracy and Welfare in Less Developed Polities," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5196, Jul.
• Armstrong, Mark, 1995, "Delegation and discretion," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 17069.
• Malcolm Coate, 1995, "The Shifting Sands of Merger Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 2, issue 3, pages 393-407, DOI: 10.1080/758538013.
• Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005, "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 729.

1994

• Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 1994, "The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number john94-1, December.
• James E. Rauch, 1994, "Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S. Cities During the Progressive Era," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 4973, Dec.

1993

• Cubitt, Robin P., 1993, "Economic policy precommitment and social welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 50, issue 3, pages 455-455, March.
• Dosi, Giovanni, 1993, "Technological paradigms and technological trajectories : A suggested interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical change," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 2, pages 102-103, April.
• Martin, Ben R. & Irvine, John, 1993, "Assessing basic research : Some partial indicators of scientific progress in radio astronomy," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 2, pages 106-106, April.
• Nelson, Richard R. & Winter, Sidney G., 1993, "In search of useful theory of innovation," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 2, pages 108-108, April.
• Teece, David J., 1993, "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 2, pages 112-113, April.
• Spiller, Pablo T. & Teubal, Morris, 1993, "Analysis of R&D failure," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 2, pages 113-113, April.
• Robert J. Barro & Paul Romer, 1993, "Economic Growth (1992)," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number barr93-1, December.

1992

• Cubitt, Robin P., 1992, "Economic policy precommitment and social welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 49, issue 2, pages 191-201, November.

1991

• Rexford E. Santerre, 1991, "Leviathan or Median-Voter: Who Runs City Hall?," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, volume 17, issue 1, pages 5-14, Jan-Mar.
• Peiser, L. & Begin, C., 1991, "La notion de profession (une revue de l'etat des connaissances)," Papers, Laval - Faculte des sciences de administration, number 91-101.
• Robert J. Barro & Paul M. Romer, 1991, "Economic Growth (1990)," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number barr91-1, December.

1987

• David Card, 1987, "Supply and Demand in the Labor Market," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section., number 608, Nov.

1986

• Teece, David J., 1986, "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 15, issue 6, pages 285-305, December.

1983

• Martin, Ben R. & Irvine, John, 1983, "Assessing basic research : Some partial indicators of scientific progress in radio astronomy," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 12, issue 2, pages 61-90, April.

1982

• Dosi, Giovanni, 1982, "Technological paradigms and technological trajectories : A suggested interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical change," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 11, issue 3, pages 147-162, June.

1980

• Roberts, Kevin, 1980, "Price-independent welfare prescriptions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 13, issue 3, pages 277-297, June.
• Auld, D. A. L. & Christofides, L. N. & Swidinsky, R. & Wilton, D. A., 1980, "A microeconomic analysis of wage determination in the Canadian public sector," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 13, issue 3, pages 369-387, June.
• Roberts, Kevin, 1980, "Price-Independent Welfare Prescriptions," Empirical Economics, Springer, volume 13, issue 3, pages 277-297, June.
• Auld, D A L, 1980, "A Microeconomic Analysis of Wage Determination in the Canadian Public Sector," Empirical Economics, Springer, volume 13, issue 3, pages 369-387, June.

1977

• Nelson, Richard R. & Winter, Sidney G., 1977, "In search of useful theory of innovation," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 6, issue 1, pages 36-76, January.
• Spiller, Pablo T. & Teubal, Morris, 1977, "analysis of r & d failure," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 6, issue 3, pages 254-275, July.

0

• Djahida Layat & Mohammed Benazza, , "The impact of corruption, natural resources on economic growth: An applied study of Algeria," Review of Socio - Economic Perspectives, Reviewsep, number 202330, DOI: https://doi.org/10.19275/RSEP173.
• Amine Tammar, , "Impact of corruption on Foreign Direct Investment in a sample of developing countries during the period (2005 - 2020): A standard study utilizing panel data," Review of Socio - Economic Perspectives, Reviewsep, number 202341, DOI: https://doi.org/10.19275/RSEP184.
• Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, , "The distortionary effects of incentives in government: Evidence from China'sdeath ceiling program," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series, Boston University - Department of Economics, number dp-282, revised Jan 2017.
• HINDRIKS, Jean & KEEN, Michael & MUTHOO, Abhinay, 2002, "Corruption, extortion and evasion," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1671, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00030-4.
• HAIMANKO, Ori & E BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, 2005, "Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1774, Jan.
• HAIMANKO, Ori & LE BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, 2007, "The stability threshold and two facets of polarization," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1930, Jan, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0069-z.
• DE LA CROIX, David & DELAVALLADE, Clara, 2007, "Corruption et allocation optimale de l'investissement public," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1990, Jan.
• DE LA CROIX, David & DELAVALLADE, Clara, 2009, "Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2107, Jan, DOI: 10.1007/s10101-008-0057-4.
• de la CROIX, David & DELAVALLADE, Clara, 2011, "Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives, and growth," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2347, Jan, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01497.x.
• Luis Gonzalez & Werner Güth & Maria Vittoria Levati, , "Speeding up Bureaucrats by Greasing Them - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, number 2002-05.
• Matthias Sutter & Martin G. Kocher, , "Favoritism of agents – The case of referees’ home bias," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, number 2002-28.
• Makram El-Shagi & Bashir Muhammad, 2019, "Institutional Similarity and Bilateral FDI," CFDS Discussion Paper Series, Center for Financial Development and Stability at Henan University, Kaifeng, Henan, China, number 2019/2, Feb.
• Leander Heldring, 2019, "The Origins of Violence in Rwanda," HiCN Working Papers, Households in Conflict Network, number 299, Mar.
• Avner Ben-Ner, , "For-Profit, State, and Nonprofit: How to Cut the Pie Among the Three Sectors," Working Papers, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus), number 0304.
• Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, , "The size and the scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians," Working Papers, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University, number 137.
• Paul A. Raschky & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, , "Who is going to save us now? Bureaucrats, Politicians and Risky Tasks," Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, number 2007-29.
• Duha T. Altindag & Junyue Xu, 2009, "The Impact of Institutions and Development on Happiness," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University, number 2009-17, Dec.
• Casey Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, , "Conscription as Regulation," Working Paper, Harvard University OpenScholar, number 19486.
• Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, , "Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption: Evidence from US States," Working Paper, Harvard University OpenScholar, number 248171.
• Alberto Alesina & Filipe Campante & Guido Tabellini, , "Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?," Working Paper, Harvard University OpenScholar, number 248206.
• Andreea ZAMFIR, , "Reforming The Public Administration Through E-Government Generalization," Proceedings of the Fifth "Administration and Public Management" International Conference: "Public Institutions' Capacity to Implement the Administrative Reform Process", Bucharest, June 23-24, 2009, Research Centre in Public Administration and Public Services, Bucharest, Romania, number 21.
• Bruce M. Owen, , ""To Promote the General Welfare": Addressing Political Corruption in America," Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, number 15-027.
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