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- Levin Mark & Movshovich Solomon, 2001. "Tax Evasion Modeling under Penalties and Refusal of Banks to Grant Loan," EERC Working Paper Series 99-306e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
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Keywordscorruption equilibrium; norms of bureaucratic behavior; Nash equilibrium; imperfection of economic institutions;
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
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