Tax Evasion Modeling under Penalties and Refusal of Banks to Grant Loan
The objective of this project is an evaluation of the scale of corruption in the Russian tax system and of economic losses in Russia. The sources of the losses are: tax evasion by corrupt economic subjects; the redistribution of the burden of taxation; the reduction of scales of economy; and the price rises. A comparison of the damage caused by corruption and the burden of taxation allows an evaluation of the effectiveness of state expenditure on the maintenance and expansion of the rating authorities. A general equilibrium approach is applied and the damage is estimated via the sum of compensatory earnings necessary for all subjects
|Date of creation:||05 Apr 2001|
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References listed on IDEAS
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