Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy
Download full text from publisherTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Other versions of this item:
- Gerald Marschke, 2002. "Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy," Discussion Papers 02-07, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gerald Marschke & Pascal Courty, 2000. "An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Performance Incentives," Discussion Papers 00-12, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
- Courty, Pascal & Marschke, Gerald, 2004. "A General Test of Gaming," CEPR Discussion Papers 4514, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nya:albaec:00-09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .