Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy
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Other versions of this item:
- Gerald Marschke, 2000. "Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy," Discussion Papers 00-09, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
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- Gerald Marschke & Pascal Courty, 2000. "An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Performance Incentives," Discussion Papers 00-12, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
- Pascal Courty & Gerald Marschke, 2004. "A General Test of Gaming," Economics Working Papers ECO2004/33, European University Institute.
More about this item
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
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