Allocating Awards Across Noncomparable Categories
Suppose an agency awards a …xed number of prizes to applicants in different categories such that the applicant-to-winner ratio is constant by category. It is demonstrated in a simple theoretical model that the number of awards in a category will typically be positively related to the degree of applicant uncertainty. The theoretical …ndings are related to awards data from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship competition.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4M4|
Phone: (905) 525-9140 ext. 22765
Fax: (905) 521-8232
Web page: http://www.economics.mcmaster.ca/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
- Fretz, Deborah & Veall, Michael R, 2001. "Economists and the ARC Large Grants Scheme: A Brief Report," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 77(237), pages 183-88, June.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2002-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.