A Note On The Relationship Between Corruption And Government Revenue
This paper empirically traces out the impacts of corruption on government revenue. The total amount of government revenue decreases as corruption reduces tax revenues if it contributes to tax evasion, improper tax exemptions or weak tax administration. In addition, corruption may distort the composition of government revenue: that is, a country with a higher level of corruption increases the proportion of international tax revenue rather than domestic tax one as the source of government revenue. Using cross-national evidence, it is identified that several corruption indices are positively and significantly associated with the taxes on international trade over current government revenue. Moreover, corruption is negatively and significantly related to the domestic tax revenue as well as total amount of government revenue over GDP.
Volume (Year): 27 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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