IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/kap/regeco/v24y2003i2p175-211.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Estrella Alonso & Gustavo Juan Tejada, 2012. "The Auction Model with Lowest Risk in a Duopolistic Electricity Market," Económica, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 0, pages 3-21, January-D.
  2. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
  3. Carine Staropoli & Celine Jullien, 2006. "Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets," Post-Print hal-00569121, HAL.
  4. Heim, Sven & Götz, Georg, 2021. "Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
  5. Just, Sebastian & Weber, Christoph, 2008. "Pricing of reserves: Valuing system reserve capacity against spot prices in electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 3198-3221, November.
  6. Andreas Voss and Reinhard Madlener, 2017. "Auction Schemes, Bidding Strategies and the Cost-Optimal Level of Promoting Renewable Electricity in Germany," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(KAPSARC S).
  7. Gert Brunekreeft & Roland Meyer & Margarethe Rammerstorfer, 2013. "Auction Design for a Strategic Reserve Market for Generation Adequacy: On the Incentives Under Different Auction Scoring Rules," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0014, Bremen Energy Research.
  8. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 2572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Estrella Alonso & Juan Tejada, 2010. "Equivalencia de Ingresos en un Duopolio Eléctrico," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 47(136), pages 191-215.
  10. Li, Gong & Shi, Jing & Qu, Xiuli, 2011. "Modeling methods for GenCo bidding strategy optimization in the liberalized electricity spot market–A state-of-the-art review," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 4686-4700.
  11. Silvia Concettini, 2014. "Merit order effect and strategic investments in intermittent generation technologies," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-44, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  12. T. S. Genc, 2009. "Discriminatory Versus Uniform-Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 9-31, January.
  13. Prandini, Alberto, 2007. "Good, BETTA, best? The role of industry structure in electricity reform in Scotland," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 1628-1642, March.
  14. Carine Staropoli & Celine Jullien, 2006. "Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00569121, HAL.
  15. Liu, Zhen & Zhang, Xiliang & Lieu, Jenny, 2010. "Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity auction market based on the signaling game theory," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 1813-1819.
  16. Anna Pechan & Christine Brandstätt & Gert Brunekreeft & Martin Palovic, "undated". "Risks and incentives for gaming in electricity redispatch markets," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0043, Bremen Energy Research.
  17. Giulietti, Monica & Grossi, Luigi & Waterson, Michael, 2010. "Price transmission in the UK electricity market: Was NETA beneficial?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1165-1174, September.
  18. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.