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Early warning models for systemic banking crises: can political indicators improve prediction?

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  • Tran Huynh

    (Friedrich Schiller University Jena)

  • Silke Uebelmesser

    (Friedrich Schiller University Jena and CESifo)

Abstract

This study provides the first attempt to evaluate whether a logit early warning system (EWS) for systemic banking crises can produce better predictions when political indicators are used alongside traditional macro-financial indicators. Based on a dataset covering 32 advanced economies for the period 1975-2017, we show that the inclusion of political indicators helps improve the predictive performance of the model. While the improvement is small, it is statistically significant and consistent for several different performance measures and robustness tests. Among the newly employed political variables, variables indicating the political ideology of the ruling party and the time in office of the incumbent chief executive show significant correlations with the likelihood of systemic banking crises. The results suggest that a systemic banking crisis is less likely when the government is left-wing and when the chief executive officer has been in office longer.

Suggested Citation

  • Tran Huynh & Silke Uebelmesser, 2022. "Early warning models for systemic banking crises: can political indicators improve prediction?," Jena Economics Research Papers 2022-007, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2022-007
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    early warning systems; systemic banking crises; vulnerability; political indicators; macro-financial indicators;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • F37 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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