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Ayça Kaya
(Ayca Kaya)

Personal Details

First Name:Ayca
Middle Name:
Last Name:Kaya
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pka1068
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://sites.google.com/site/aycakaya/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Miami Herbert Business School
University of Miami

Coral Gables, Florida (United States)
https://herbert.miami.edu/economics
RePEc:edi:demiaus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Ayca Kaya & Santanu Roy, 2023. "Repeated Trading: Transparency and Market Structure," Departmental Working Papers 2301, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  2. Ayca Kaya & Santanu Roy, 2020. "Market Screening with Limited Records," Departmental Working Papers 2006, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  3. Ayca Kaya & Santanu Roy, 2020. "Price Transparency and Market Screening," Departmental Working Papers 2008, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  4. Galina Vereshchagina & Ayca Kaya, 2009. "Endogenous matching predictions in a repeated partnership model with imperfect monitoring," 2009 Meeting Papers 829, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Ayca Kaya, 2007. "When does it pay to get informed?," 2007 Meeting Papers 572, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Ayça Kaya, 2005. "Repeated Signaling Games," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  7. Semih Koray & Ayca Kaya, 1999. "A Characterization of Solution Concepts that Implement Monotonic Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 9913, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
    repec:smu:ecowpa:2205 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Kaya, Ayça, 2023. "Paying with information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
  2. Kaya, Ayça & Roy, Santanu, 2022. "Market screening with limited records," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 106-132.
  3. Kaya, Ayça & Vereshchagina, Galina, 2022. "Sorting expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  4. Cetemen, Doruk & Hwang, Ilwoo & Kaya, Ayça, 2020. "Uncertainty-driven cooperation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
  5. Ayça Kaya & Kyungmin Kim, 2018. "Trading Dynamics with Private Buyer Signals in the Market for Lemons," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2318-2352.
  6. Kaya, Ayça & Liu, Qingmin, 2015. "Transparency and price formation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  7. Ayça Kaya & Galina Vereshchagina, 2015. "Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 73-121, September.
  8. Ayca Kaya & Galina Vereshchagina, 2014. "Partnerships versus Corporations: Moral Hazard, Sorting, and Ownership Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 291-307, January.
  9. Ayca Kaya, 2013. "Dynamics of price and advertising as quality signals: anything goes," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1556-1564.
  10. Ayça Kaya, 2010. "When Does It Pay To Get Informed?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(2), pages 533-551, May.
  11. Kaya, Ayça, 2009. "Repeated signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 841-854, July.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Ayca Kaya & Santanu Roy, 2020. "Market Screening with Limited Records," Departmental Working Papers 2006, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Building under Observational Learning," Papers 2006.08068, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
    2. Barsanetti, Bruno & Camargo, Braz, 2022. "Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    3. Harry Pei, 2022. "Reputation Effects under Short Memories," Papers 2207.02744, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.

  2. Ayca Kaya, 2007. "When does it pay to get informed?," 2007 Meeting Papers 572, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Pio Baake & Andreas Harasser & Friederike Heiny, 2016. "Information Acquisition in Vertical Relations," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1543, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Schumacher, Heiner & Thysen, Heidi Christina, 2022. "Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
    3. Bin R. Chen & Sanxi Li, 2018. "Prehire Screening and Subjective Performance Evaluations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4953-4965, October.
    4. Mylovanov, Timofiy & Troger, Thomas E., 2012. "Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    5. Nicholas Charles Bedard, 2017. "Contracts in informed-principal problems with moral hazard," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 21-34, April.
    6. Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017. "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 548-561.
    7. Chen, Bin R., 2015. "Subjective performance feedback, ability attribution, and renegotiation-proof contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 155-174.
    8. Wagner, Christoph & Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2015. "Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 280-289.
    9. McLeod, Alex, 2021. "Discovery, disclosure, and confidence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).

  3. Ayça Kaya, 2005. "Repeated Signaling Games," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Sander Heinsalu, 2017. "Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switching efforts," Papers 1707.04699, arXiv.org.
    2. Vaziri, M., 2022. "Antitrust Law and Business Dynamism," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2219, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Sanghoon Lee, 2007. "The Timing Of Signaling: To Study In High School Or In College?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 785-807, August.
    4. Jiri Chod & Nikolaos Trichakis & Gerry Tsoukalas, 2019. "Supplier Diversification Under Buyer Risk," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(7), pages 3150-3173, July.
    5. Byoung Heon Jun & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Anti-Limit Pricing," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000041, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Trevon D. Logan & Manisha Shah, 2013. "Face Value: Information and Signaling in an Illegal Market," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 79(3), pages 529-564, January.
    7. Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2010. "Dynamic Limit Pricing," CEPR Discussion Papers 8104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Egor Starkov, 2020. "Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling," Papers 2007.09568, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    9. Dilmé, Francesc, 2017. "Noisy signaling in discrete time," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 13-25.
    10. Po-Hsuan Lin, 2022. "Cognitive Hierarchies in Multi-Stage Games of Incomplete Information: Theory and Experiment," Papers 2208.11190, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    11. Kang, Kee-Youn & Jang, Inkee, 2020. "Dynamic Adverse Selection and Belief Update in Credit Markets," MPRA Paper 99071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan, 2008. "Job Market Signaling and Job Search," Discussion Papers 10, Kyiv School of Economics, revised Sep 2008.
    13. Matthew Mitchell, 2021. "Free ad(vice): internet influencers and disclosure regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 3-21, March.
    14. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
    15. Vaziri, M., 2022. "Antitrust Law and Business Dynamism," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2243, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    16. Chia-Hui Chen, 2012. "Type composition, career concerns, and signaling efforts," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 401-422, September.
    17. Matthew Mitchell, 2018. "Free (Ad)vice," 2018 Meeting Papers 1194, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Félix Muñoz-García & Heriberto González Lozano, 2009. "“Last-chance” sales: what makes them credible?," Ensayos Revista de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, vol. 0(1), pages 61-80, May.
    19. Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2019. "Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 356-380.
    20. Soeren Johansen & Anders Rygh Swensen, 2021. "Adjustment coefficients and exact rational expectations in cointegrated vector autoregressive models," Discussion Papers 21-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    21. Christopher Gedge & James W. Roberts & Andrew Sweeting, 2014. "A Model of Dynamic Limit Pricing with an Application to the Airline Industry," NBER Working Papers 20293, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Brendan Daley & Erik Snowberg, 2007. "A MultiDimensional Signaling Model of Campaign Finance," Discussion Papers 06-027, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    23. Heinsalu, Sander, 2017. "Good signals gone bad: Dynamic signalling with switched effort levels," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 132-141.
    24. Ayca Kaya, 2013. "Dynamics of price and advertising as quality signals: anything goes," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1556-1564.

Articles

  1. Kaya, Ayça, 2023. "Paying with information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. Ian Ball, 2023. "Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1363-1391, July.

  2. Kaya, Ayça & Roy, Santanu, 2022. "Market screening with limited records," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 106-132.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Cetemen, Doruk & Hwang, Ilwoo & Kaya, Ayça, 2020. "Uncertainty-driven cooperation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.

    Cited by:

    1. Doruk Cetemen & Can Urgun & Leeat Yariv, 2023. "Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2402-2450.

  4. Ayça Kaya & Kyungmin Kim, 2018. "Trading Dynamics with Private Buyer Signals in the Market for Lemons," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2318-2352.

    Cited by:

    1. Hu, Yunzhi, 2022. "A dynamic theory of bank lending, firm entry, and investment fluctuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    2. Ben Casner, 2021. "Learning while shopping: an experimental investigation into the effect of learning on consumer search," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(1), pages 238-273, March.
    3. Heinsalu, Sander, 2020. "Investing to access an adverse selection market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    4. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 116-136.
    5. Egor Starkov, 2020. "Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling," Papers 2007.09568, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    6. Hwang, Ilwoo, 2018. "Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 761-802.
    7. Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 203-298, February.
    8. Huck, Nicolas & Mavoori, Hareesh & Mesly, Olivier, 2020. "The rationality of irrationality in times of financial crises," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 337-350.
    9. Kaya, Ayça & Roy, Santanu, 2022. "Market screening with limited records," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 106-132.
    10. Auster, Sarah & Gottardi, Piero & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2024. "Simultaneous Search and Adverse Selection," IZA Discussion Papers 16822, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Peter Wagner, 2023. "Seller experimentation and trade," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 337-357, June.
    12. Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri & Ignacio Monzón, 2022. "Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1591-1620, May.
    13. Hwang, Ilwoo, 2018. "A theory of bargaining deadlock," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 501-522.
    14. Maarten C.W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2023. "Information Uncertainty," Departmental Working Papers 2306, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
    15. Francesc Dilmé, 2024. "Bargaining with Binary Private Information," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 284, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    16. Soeren Johansen & Anders Rygh Swensen, 2021. "Adjustment coefficients and exact rational expectations in cointegrated vector autoregressive models," Discussion Papers 21-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    17. Justus Preusser & Andre Speit, 2023. "Transparency in Sequential Common-Value Trade," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_487, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    18. Choi, Michael, 2018. "Imperfect information transmission and adverse selection in asset markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 619-649.
    19. Barsanetti, Bruno & Camargo, Braz, 2022. "Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).

  5. Kaya, Ayça & Liu, Qingmin, 2015. "Transparency and price formation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. Ronen Gradwohl & Rann Smorodinsky, 2021. "Privacy, Patience, and Protection," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 759-784, December.
    2. Hwang, Ilwoo, 2018. "Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 761-802.
    3. William Fuchs & Aniko Ory & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2015. "Transparency and Distressed Sales under Asymmetric Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1986, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Kim, Kyungmin, 2017. "Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 365-399.
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Johannes Horner, 2010. "Should Auctions be Transparent?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1764, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Fuchs, William & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2015. "Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 371-406.
    7. Yasunari Tamada, 2019. "Disclosure of Contract Clauses and Career Concerns," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(3), pages 1968-1978.
    8. William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2019. "Costs and benefits of dynamic trading in a lemons market," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 105-127, July.
    9. Hwang, Ilwoo & Li, Fei, 2017. "Transparency of outside options in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 116-147.
    10. Chernulich, Aleksei & Horowitz, John & Rabanal, Jean Paul & Rud, Olga A & Sharifova , Manizha, 2021. "Entry and exit decisions under public and private information: An experiment," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2021/3, University of Stavanger.
    11. Aleksei Chernulich & John Horowitz & Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga Rud & Manizha Sharifova, 2023. "Entry and exit decisions under public and private information: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(2), pages 339-356, April.
    12. Michele Bee & Juan Pablo Gama, 2022. "A process of demand discovery from a smithian perspective," Textos para Discussão Cedeplar-UFMG 647, Cedeplar, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.
    13. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Das, Kaustav, 2017. "Bilateral trading and incomplete information: Price convergence in a small market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 89-113.

  6. Ayça Kaya & Galina Vereshchagina, 2015. "Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 73-121, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Tianyu Ma & Zhuofu Wang & Jiyong Ding, 2018. "Governing the Moral Hazard in China’s Sponge City Projects: A Managerial Analysis of the Construction in the Non-Public Land," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-15, August.
    2. Sperisen, Benjamin & Wiseman, Thomas, 2020. "Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 491-511.
    3. Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5851, CESifo.
    4. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2017. "Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 11869, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Karaivanov, Alexander, 2014. "Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 239-249.
    6. Matt Mitchell & Galina Vereshchagina & April Franco, 2009. "Incentives and the Structure of Teams," 2009 Meeting Papers 758, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Bel, Roland & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2012. "On Broadway and strip malls: how to make a winning team," Working Papers 2012-14, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    8. Vereshchagina, Galina, 2019. "The role of individual financial contributions in the formation of entrepreneurial teams," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 173-193.

  7. Ayca Kaya & Galina Vereshchagina, 2014. "Partnerships versus Corporations: Moral Hazard, Sorting, and Ownership Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 291-307, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Altinok Ahmet & Mac Donald Diana E., 2023. "Designing the Menu of Licenses for Foster Care," Working Papers 2023-19, Banco de México.
    2. Matthias Kräkel, 2017. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 295-311, April.
    3. Ayça Kaya & Galina Vereshchagina, 2015. "Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 73-121, September.
    4. Ashwin Kambhampati & Carlos Segura‐Rodriguez, 2022. "The optimal assortativity of teams inside the firm," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(3), pages 484-515, September.
    5. Guinnane, Timothy W. & Schneebacher, Jakob, 2020. "Enterprise form: Theory and history," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    6. Bel, Roland & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2015. "Team composition, worker effort and welfare," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-8.
    7. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2017. "Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 11869, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Anja Schöttner, 2017. "Optimal Sales Force Compensation in Dynamic Settings: Commissions vs. Bonuses," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(5), pages 1529-1544, May.
    9. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2016. "Optimal sales force compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 179-195.
    10. Huseyin Yildirim, 2023. "Who fares better in teamwork?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(2), pages 299-324, June.
    11. Timothy Guinnane & Jakob Schneebacher, 2018. "Capital Structure and the Choice of Enterprise Form: theory and history," Working Papers 1061, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    12. Jonathan Glover & Eunhee Kim, 2021. "Optimal Team Composition: Diversity to Foster Implicit Team Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5800-5820, September.
    13. Matthias Kräkel, 2016. "Human Capital Investment and Work Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 627-651, September.
    14. Emilio Espino & Julian Kozlowski & Juan M. Sanchez, 2013. "Too big to cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships," Working Papers 2013-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    15. Galina Vereshchagina, 2017. "The Impact of Moral Hazard and Budget Balancing on Sorting in Partnerships," 2017 Meeting Papers 1452, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Rao, Ramesh K.S., 2015. "The public corporation as an intermediary between “Main Street” and “Wall Street”," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 64-82.
    17. Kräkel, Matthias, 2021. "On the delegation of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 965-981.
    18. Lam, Wing Tung, 2020. "Inefficient sorting under output sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    19. Vereshchagina, Galina, 2019. "The role of individual financial contributions in the formation of entrepreneurial teams," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 173-193.
    20. Akhigbe, Aigbe & McNulty, James E. & Stevenson, Bradley A., 2017. "Does the form of ownership affect firm performance? Evidence from US bank profit efficiency before and during the financial crisis," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 120-129.
    21. Huo, Jingjing, 2015. "How Nations Innovate: The Political Economy of Technological Innovation in Affluent Capitalist Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198735847.
    22. Emilio Espino & Julian Kozlowski & Juan M. Sanchez, 2016. "Stylized Facts on the Organization of Small Business Partnerships," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 98(4), pages 297-310.

  8. Ayca Kaya, 2013. "Dynamics of price and advertising as quality signals: anything goes," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1556-1564.

    Cited by:

    1. Egor Starkov, 2020. "Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling," Papers 2007.09568, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    2. Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Berg, Nathan, 2017. "Reexamining the Schmalensee effect," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 11, pages 1-12.
    3. Soeren Johansen & Anders Rygh Swensen, 2021. "Adjustment coefficients and exact rational expectations in cointegrated vector autoregressive models," Discussion Papers 21-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.

  9. Ayça Kaya, 2010. "When Does It Pay To Get Informed?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(2), pages 533-551, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Kaya, Ayça, 2009. "Repeated signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 841-854, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2005-11-19 2020-09-14 2023-02-13 2023-04-03
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2020-09-14 2023-02-13 2023-04-03
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2020-09-14 2023-02-13 2023-04-03
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2023-02-13 2023-04-03
  5. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2020-09-14

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