“Last-chance” sales: what makes them credible?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Linnemer, Laurent, 2002.
"Price and advertising as signals of quality when some consumers are informed,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
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More about this item
Keywordssignaling; advertising; separating equilibria; information transmission;
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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