Early Sales of Bordeaux grands crus
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Other versions of this item:
- Philippe Mahenc & Valérie Meunier, 2006. "Early Sales of Bordeaux grands crus," Post-Print hal-02080994, HAL.
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Cited by:
- Dubois, Pierre & Nauges, Céline, 2010.
"Identifying the effect of unobserved quality and expert reviews in the pricing of experience goods: Empirical application on Bordeaux wine,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 205-212, May.
- Dubois, P. & Nauges, C., 2006. "Identifying the effect of unobserved quality and experts' reviews in the pricing of experience goods : empirical application on Bordeaux wine," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 200607, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
- Dubois, Pierre & Nauges, Celine, 2007. "Identifying the Effect of Unobserved Quality and Expert Reviews in the Pricing of Experience Goods: Empirical Application on Bordeaux Wine," Working Papers 37320, American Association of Wine Economists.
- Dubois, Pierre & Nauges, Céline, 2006. "Identifying the Effect of Unobserved Quality and Experts' Reviews in the Pricing of Experience Goods: Empirical Application on Bordeaux Wine," IDEI Working Papers 395, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Marcin Czupryna, 2021.
"On the Extension of the Kiyotaki and Wright model to Transformable Goods,"
Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 57(4), pages 989-1014, April.
- Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Marcin Czupryna, 2020. "On the Extension of the Kiyotaki and Wright model to Transformable Goods," Post-Print ijn_03081002, HAL.
- Schnabel Hubert & Storchmann Karl, 2010. "Prices as Quality Signals: Evidence from the Wine Market," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-23, February.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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