Too Big to Cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Emilio Espino & Julian Kozlowski & Juan M. Sanchez, 2013. "Too big to cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships," Working Papers 2013-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
References listed on IDEAS
- Espino, Emilio, 2005.
"On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 192-213, April.
- Espino, Emilio, 2004. "On Ramsey's Conjecture: Efficient Allocations in the Neoclassical Growth Model with Private Information," Economics Series 154, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, 2005.
"Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(1), pages 131-171.
- Steven Tadelis & Jonathan Levin, 2004. "Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships," 2004 Meeting Papers 156, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatale, 2010.
"A Theory of Firm Decline,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(4), pages 861-885, October.
- Sonia Di Giannatale Menegalli & Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley, 2008. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Working papers DTE 445, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatale, 2009. "A Theory of Firm Decline," NBER Working Papers 15192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Sonia B. Di Giannatale, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000149, David K. Levine.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Sonia DiGiannatale, 2009. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Working Papers 09-05, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Gian Luca, Clementi & Cooley, Thomas & Di Giannatale, Sonia, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Institutions and Markets Papers 92788, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatale, 2008. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Working Paper series 33_08, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatal, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Working Papers 2010.88, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni & Christopher Sleet, 2012.
"Recursive Methods for Incentive Problems,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(4), pages 501-525, October.
- Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni & Christopher Sleet, 2011. "Recursive methods for incentive problems," Working Papers 381, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Harold L. Cole & Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez, 2016.
"Why Doesn't Technology Flow From Rich to Poor Countries?,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1477-1521, July.
- Harold L. Cole & Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez, 2012. "Why doesn’t technology flow from rich to poor countries?," Working Papers 2012-040, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 01 Oct 2015.
- Harold L. Cole & Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez, 2015. "Why Doesn't Technology Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?," NBER Working Papers 20856, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Harold L. Cole & Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez, 2016. "Why Doesn't Technology Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?," RCER Working Papers 594, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Harold L Cole & Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M Sanchez, 2014. "Why Doesn't Technology Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?," Economie d'Avant Garde Research Reports 25, Economie d'Avant Garde.
- Juan Sanchez & Jeremy Greenwood & Harold Cole, 2012. "Why Doesn't Technology Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?," 2012 Meeting Papers 834, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Abraham, Arpad & Pavoni, Nicola, 2004.
"Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending,"
Working Papers
04-05, Duke University, Department of Economics.
- Abraham Arpad & Nicola Pavoni, 2004. "Efficient Allocations, with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000138, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Khan, Aubhik & Ravikumar, B., 2001.
"Growth and risk-sharing with private information,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 499-521, June.
- Khan, A. & Ravikumar, B., 1997. "Growth and Risk-Sharing with Private Information," Working Papers 97-13, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 1998. "Growth and Risk-Sharing with Private Information," Macroeconomics 9802003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 1999. "Growth and risk-sharing with private information," Working Papers 99-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Andrew Atkeson & Robert E. Lucas, 1992.
"On Efficient Distribution With Private Information,"
Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 427-453.
- Andrew Atkeson & Robert E Lucas, 2010. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2179, David K. Levine.
- Marcet, Albert & Marimon, Ramon, 1992.
"Communication, commitment, and growth,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 219-249, December.
- Albert Marcet & Ramon Marimon, 1991. "Communication, commitment and growth," Economics Working Papers 1, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Albert Marcet & Ramon Marimon, 1992. "Communication, commitment, and growth," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 74, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000.
"Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,"
Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-419, June.
- Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1984.
"Optimal growth with many consumers,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 139-171, February.
- Robert E. Lucas Jr. & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "Optimal Growth with Many Consumers," Discussion Papers 518, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Russell Cooper & Joao Ejarque, 2003. "Financial Frictions and Investment: Requiem in Q," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(4), pages 710-728, October.
- R. Glenn Hubbard, 1998.
"Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 193-225, March.
- R. Glenn Hubbard, 1997. "Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment," NBER Working Papers 5996, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2006. "A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(1), pages 229-265.
- Ayca Kaya & Galina Vereshchagina, 2014. "Partnerships versus Corporations: Moral Hazard, Sorting, and Ownership Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 291-307, January.
- Pavoni, Nicola, 2007. "On optimal unemployment compensation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(6), pages 1612-1630, September.
- Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990.
"Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August.
- J. Thomas & T. Worrall, 2010. "Income Fluctuations and Asymmetric Information: An Example of the Repeated Principal Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2077, David K. Levine.
- Mele, Antonio, 2014.
"Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 69-85.
- Antonio Mele, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard and Recursive Lagrangeans," 2008 Meeting Papers 482, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mele, Antonio, 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," MPRA Paper 30310, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mele, Antonio, 2010. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," MPRA Paper 21741, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997.
"Optimal Unemployment Insurance,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-438, April.
- Hopenhayn, H. & Nicolini, P.J., 1996. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," RCER Working Papers 421, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Lars Ljungqvist & Thomas Sargent, 1999. "Matlab code for Hopenhayn-Nicolini's optimal unemployment insurance model," QM&RBC Codes 18, Quantitative Macroeconomics & Real Business Cycles.
- Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
- Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1998.
"Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Patrick BOLTON & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1996. "Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 9619, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Bolton, P. & von Thadden, E.L., 1996. "Blocks, liquidity and corporate control," Discussion Paper 1996-80, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2004. "Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 713-751, May.
- Arpad Abraham & Nicola Pavoni, 2008.
"Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 781-803, October.
- Arpad Abraham & Nicola Pavoni, 2008. "Code for "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation"," Computer Codes 06-26, Review of Economic Dynamics.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Nicholas Economides, 2014.
"Bundling and Tying,"
Working Papers
14-22, NET Institute.
- Nicholas Economides, 2015. "Bundling and Tying," Working Papers 15-01, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A. & Werquin, N., 2016.
"Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets,"
Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.),Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 725-841,
Elsevier.
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski & Nicolas Werquin, 2016. "Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets," NBER Working Papers 22012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yunmin Chen & YiLi Chien & Michael T. Owyang, 2015. "Individual and Aggregate Constrained Efficient Intertemporal Wedges in Dynamic Mirrleesian Economies," Working Papers 2015-43, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Emilio Espino & Julian Kozlowski & Juan M. Sanchez, 2016. "Stylized Facts on the Organization of Small Business Partnerships," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 98(4), pages 297-310.
More about this item
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DGE-2015-11-21 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed015:1308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.