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Recursive Methods for Incentive Problems

Author

Listed:
  • Matthias Messner

    (Universita Bocconi)

  • Nicola Pavoni

    (University College London)

  • Christopher Sleet

    (Carnegie Mellon University)

Abstract

Many dynamic incentive problems have primal recursive formulations in which utility promises serve as state variables. We associate families of dual recursive problems with these by selectively dualizing constraints. We make transparent the connections between recursive primal and dual approaches, relate value iteration under each and give conditions for such value iteration to be convergent to the true value function. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni & Christopher Sleet, 2012. "Recursive Methods for Incentive Problems," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(4), pages 501-525, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:12-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2012.07.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emmanuel Farhi & Iván Werning, 2007. "Inequality and Social Discounting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 365-402.
    2. Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni & Christopher Sleet, "undated". "Contractive Dual Methods for Incentive Problems," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E26, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    3. Harold Cole & Felix Kubler, 2012. "Recursive Contracts, Lotteries and Weakly Concave Pareto Sets," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(4), pages 479-500, October.
    4. Kenneth L. Judd & Sevin Yeltekin & James Conklin, 2003. "Computing Supergame Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1239-1254, July.
    5. Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni, 2016. "On the Recursive Saddle Point Method," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 161-173, June.
    6. Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni & Sleet Christopher, 2011. "On the Dual Approach to Recursive Optimization," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E8, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    7. Fernandes, Ana & Phelan, Christopher, 2000. "A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 223-247, April.
    8. Messner Matthias & Pavoni Nicola & Sleet Christopher, "undated". "On the Dual Approach to Recursive Optimization," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E12, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    9. Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
    10. Kydland, Finn E. & Prescott, Edward C., 1980. "Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations and optimal control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 79-91, May.
    11. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609.
    12. Arpad Abraham & Nicola Pavoni, 2008. "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 781-803, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Messner Matthias & Pavoni Nicola & Sleet Christopher, "undated". "On the Dual Approach to Recursive Optimization," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E12, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    2. Miao, Jianjun & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2015. "A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 929-988.
    3. Lilia Maliar & Serguei Maliar, 2016. "Ruling Out Multiplicity of Smooth Equilibria in Dynamic Games: A Hyperbolic Discounting Example," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 243-261, June.
    4. Harold Cole & Felix Kubler, 2012. "Recursive Contracts, Lotteries and Weakly Concave Pareto Sets," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(4), pages 479-500, October.
    5. Espino, Emilio & Kozlowski, Julian & Sánchez, Juan M., 2013. "Too big to cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships," Working Papers 2013-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 30 Sep 2017.
    6. Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A. & Werquin, N., 2016. "Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets," Handbook of Macroeconomics, Elsevier.
    7. Balbus, Łukasz & Reffett, Kevin & Woźny, Łukasz, 2012. "Stationary Markovian equilibrium in altruistic stochastic OLG models with limited commitment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 115-132.
    8. Messner Matthias & Pavoni Nicola & Sleet Christopher, "undated". "On the Dual Approach to Recursive Optimization," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E12, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    9. Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017. "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp605, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    10. Łukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2013. "Markov Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Supermodular Games with Imperfect Private and Public Information," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 187-206, June.
    11. Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni & Christopher Sleet, "undated". "Contractive Dual Methods for Incentive Problems," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E26, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    12. Yili Chien & Harold Cole & Hanno Lustig, 2016. "Implications of Heterogeneity in Preferences, Beliefs and Asset Trading Technologies in an Endowment Economy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 20, pages 215-239, April.
    13. Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017. "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," Working Papers 1705, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2017.
    14. Kam, Timothy & Stauber, Ronald, 2016. "Solving dynamic public insurance games with endogenous agent distributions: Theory and computational approximation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 77-98.
    15. Łukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2015. "Time consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumers," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 83-112, February.
    16. Charles Brendon, 2011. "Applying perturbation analysis to dynamic optimal tax problems," Economics Series Working Papers 581, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic contracts; Duality; Dynamic programming;

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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