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Anti-Limit Pricing

  • Byoung Heon Jun

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Korea University)

  • In-Uck Park

Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we present an infinite horizon entry model, where the incumbent(s) may use the current price to signal its strength to deter entry. We show that, due to the importance of entrants' types on the post-entry duopoly/oligopoly pro?ts, the incumbent(s) may want to signal its weakness to invite entry of weaker firms

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File URL: http://econ.korea.ac.kr/~ri/WorkingPapers/w0503.pdf
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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Korea University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 0503.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:iek:wpaper:0503
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  1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-59, March.
  2. Jun, Byoung Heon & Park, In-Uck, 2010. "Anti-Limit Pricing," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 51(2), pages 1-22, December.
  3. Noldecke,Georg & van Damme,Eric, 1988. "Signalling in a dynamic labor market," Discussion Paper Serie A 148, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Steven A. Matthews & Leonard J. Mirman, 1981. "Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand," Discussion Papers 494, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1987. "Oligopolistic Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 211-231, Summer.
  6. Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2007. "Dynamic signaling and market breakdown," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 58-82, March.
  7. Ashiya, Masahiro, 2000. "Weak entrants are welcome," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 975-984, August.
  8. Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1999. "Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(4), pages 949-70, October.
  9. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1989. "Oligopoly Limit Pricing," Discussion Papers 829, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Kyle Bagwell & Michael Riordan, 1988. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," Discussion Papers 808, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Bagwell, Kyle & Ramey, Garey, 1990. "Advertising and pricing to deter or accommodate entry when demand is unknown," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 93-113.
  12. Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 1994. "Equilibrium effects of potential entry when prices signal quality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 367-383, February.
  13. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  14. Ayça Kaya, 2005. "Repeated Signaling Games," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  15. Oz Shy, 1996. "Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262691795, June.
  16. Katharine E. Rockett, 1990. "Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 161-171, Spring.
  17. B. Douglas Bernheim, 1984. "Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 1-11, Spring.
  18. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1986. "Limit Pricing When the Potential Entrant Is Uncertain of Its Cost Function [Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 429-37, March.
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