Bid Average Methods in Procurement
Procurement awarding mechanisms based on average price have been advocated to soften price competition and reduce cost overruns. We show that their theoretical support is shaky. When the bid closest to the average is awarded, firms submit identical bids, making the selection extremely costly and random, without reducing opportunistic behaviors ex-post. When instead the bid closest and below the average is awarded, the equilibrium is very sensitive to firms' production and participation costs. Either it displays tougher competition than in a first price auction, or it induces firms to randomize their bids.
Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January-February)
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- R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 326-338, Autumn.
- Paul Klemperer, 2004.
"Auctions: Theory and Practice,"
Economics Series Working Papers
2004-W09, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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