Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction
If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction than in an ascending auction.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hausch, Donald B & Li, Lode, 1993. "A Common Value Auction Model with Endogenous Entry and Information Acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 315-334, April.
- Nicola Persico, 1997.
"Information Acquisition in Auctions,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
762, UCLA Department of Economics.
- CrÃ©mer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007.
"Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition,"
Staff General Research Papers Archive
12709, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Vaimaki, 2000.
"Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1248, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1007-1033, May.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007.
"Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats?,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 355-372, 06.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Auctions and Informaton Acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," Post-Print halshs-00754227, HAL.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Gretschko, Vitali & Rasch, Alexander & Wambach, Achim, 2014. "On the strictly descending multi-unit auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 79-85.
- Octavian Carare & Michael Rothkopf, 2005. "Slow Dutch Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 365-373, March.
- Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
- Grimm, Veronika & Schmidt, Ulrich, 1998. "Equilibrium bidding without the independence axiom: A graphical analysis," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,40, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7023. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.