IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v61y2015i12p2945-2962.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Entry and Subcontracting in Public Procurement Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Nicola Branzoli

    () (Directorate General for Economics, Statistics, and Research, Bank of Italy, 00184 Rome, Italy)

  • Francesco Decarolis

    () (Department of Economics, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215)

Abstract

We empirically study how the interplay between entry and subcontracting choices is affected by the use of different auction formats in public procurement. The difference-in-differences strategy used exploits a data set of auctions for public works run alternately under first price and average bid auctions. We find that the use of first price auctions causes a marked decline in both entry and subcontracting. We also find that the type of firms entering first price auctions changes with firms becoming more likely to bid jointly with other firms in ad hoc joint ventures.Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2071 . This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics .

Suggested Citation

  • Nicola Branzoli & Francesco Decarolis, 2015. "Entry and Subcontracting in Public Procurement Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(12), pages 2945-2962, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:61:y:2015:i:12:p:2945-2962
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2071
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Decio Coviello & Andrea Guglielmo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance," CEIS Research Paper 361, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 17 Nov 2015.
    2. Francesco Decarolis & Cristina Giorgiantonio, 2014. "Qualificazione, aggiudicazione e subappalti nei lavori pubblici: cosa insegnano le riforme locali?," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2014(1), pages 28-64.
    3. repec:eee:jeborg:v:137:y:2017:i:c:p:113-131 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Ari Hyytinen & Sofia Lundberg & Otto Toivanen, 2015. " Design of public procurement auctions: Evidence from cleaning contracts," Working Papers Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation (MSI) 483670, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation (MSI).
    5. Olga Chiappinelli, 2017. "Decentralization and Public Procurement Performance: New Evidence from Italy," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1704, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Laura Rondi & Paola Valbonesi, 2017. "Pre- and post-award outsourcing: Temporary partnership versus subcontracting in public procurement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0211, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    7. Francesco Decarolis & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Riccardo Pacini, 2016. "Past Performance and Procurement Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 22814, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Rosa, Benjamin, 2016. "Subcontracting Requirements and the Cost of Government Procurement," MPRA Paper 77392, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2017. "Can the Private Sector Ensure the Public Interest? Evidence from Federal Procurement," CEIS Research Paper 411, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 20 Jul 2017.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:61:y:2015:i:12:p:2945-2962. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.