Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011.
"Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 126(1), pages 207-257.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2008. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," NBER Working Papers 14590, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2008. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," Discussion Papers 08-012, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Patrick Bajari, 2001. "Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(1), pages 187-205.
- Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2002.
"Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 871-898.
- Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2001. "Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement," Economics Working Paper Archive 447, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Bajari, Patrick & Hortacsu, Ali, 2003. " The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 329-355, Summer.
- Tong Li, 2005. "Econometrics of first-price auctions with entry and binding reservation prices," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 173-200, May.
- Andrew Schotter & Allan Corns, 1999.
"Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 291-305, March.
- Corns, Allan & Schotter, Andrew, 1996. "Can Affirmative Action be Cost-Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions," Working Papers 96-02, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Elena Krasnokutskaya, 2011. "Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 293-327.
- Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pai, 2013.
"What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach,"
Journal of Econometrics,
Elsevier, vol. 176(1), pages 46-58.
- Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pai, 2007. "What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach," Microeconomics.ca working papers marmer-07-11-22-02-26-44, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 18 Feb 2011.
- Francesco Decarolis, 2009.
"When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement,"
Temi di discussione (Economic working papers)
717, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Francesco Decarolis, 2009. "When the Highest Bidder Loses the Auction: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," 2009 Meeting Papers 130, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Marion, Justin, 2007. "Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1591-1624, August.
- Tong Li & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2009.
"Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1397-1429.
- Tong Li & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2006. "Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions," CeMMAP working papers CWP13/06, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, 1996. "Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition," Papers of Peter Cramton 96slr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Justin Marion, 2009. "How Costly Is Affirmative Action? Government Contracting and California's Proposition 209," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(3), pages 503-522, August.
More about this item
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
- R42 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government and Private Investment Analysis; Road Maintenance; Transportation Planning
ListsThis item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
- Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions (AER 2011) in ReplicationWiki
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:6:p:2653-86. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael P. Albert). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.