Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
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- Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2001. "Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement," Economics Working Paper Archive 447, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
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- Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2008. "Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 37-56, April.
- Gian Luigi Albano & Federico Dini & Roberto Zampino, 2008. "Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services," Working Papers 2008.86, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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