Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson: Mechanism Design Theory
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More about this item
KeywordsMechanism Design; Asymmetric Information;
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-05-05 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2008-05-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2008-05-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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