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Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson: Mechanism Design Theory

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  • Committee, Nobel Prize

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Abstract

Scientific Background, The Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2007. Economic transactions take place in markets, within firms and under a host of other institutional arrangements. Some markets are free of government intervention while others are regulated. Within firms, some transactions are guided by market prices, some are negotiated, and yet others are dictated by management. Mechanism design theory provides a coherent framework for analyzing this great variety of institutions, or "allocation mechanisms", with a focus on the problems associated with incentives and private information.

Suggested Citation

  • Committee, Nobel Prize, 2007. "Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson: Mechanism Design Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2007-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_002
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    File URL: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2007/advanced-economicsciences2007.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Baliga, Sandeep & Maskin, Eric, 2003. "Mechanism design for the environment," Handbook of Environmental Economics,in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 305-324 Elsevier.
    8. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "What Really Matters in Auction Design, from Auctions: Theory and Practice," Introductory Chapters,in: Auctions: Theory and Practice Princeton University Press.
    9. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
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    13. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
    14. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism Design; Asymmetric Information;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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