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The Role of the State in Economic Development


  • Guido Tabellini


This paper discusses the recent literature on the role of the state in economic development. It concludes that government incentives to enact sound policies are key to economic success. It also discusses the evidence on what happens after episodes of economic and political liberalizations, asking whether political liberalizations strengthen government incentives to enact sound economic policies. The answer is mixed. Most episodes of economic liberalizations are indeed preceded by political liberalizations. But the countries that have done better are those that have managed to open up the economy first, and only later have liberalized their political system. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..

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  • Guido Tabellini, 2005. "The Role of the State in Economic Development," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 283-303, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:58:y:2005:i:2:p:283-303

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics,in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482 Elsevier.
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    7. James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2013. "The Political Economy of Clientelism," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(2), pages 260-291, April.
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    9. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995, October.
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    1. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/4vc7skecu3q7u7s984pgpg64m is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Esther Ademmer & Joscha Beckmann & Rainer Schweickert, 2014. "Large-scale Transformations of Socio-economic Institutions," WWWforEurope Working Papers series 75, WWWforEurope.
    3. Ang, James B., 2013. "Are modern financial systems shaped by state antiquity?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4038-4058.
    4. Eiji Yamamura & Inyong Shin, 2009. "Effects of Income Inequality on Growth through Efficiency Improvement and Capital Accumulation," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 237-258.
    5. Franco Mariuzzo & Patrick Paul Walsh & Ciara Whelan, 2004. "EU Merger Control in Differentiated Product Industries," CESifo Working Paper Series 1312, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. David Hulme & Antonio Savoia & Kunal Sen, 2015. "Governance as a Global Development Goal? Setting, Measuring and Monitoring the Post-2015 Development Agenda," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 6(2), pages 85-96, May.
    7. Victor Nee & Sonja Opper, 2009. "Bureaucracy and Financial Markets," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 293-315, April.
    8. Beraldo, Sergio & Montolio, Daniel & Turati, Gilberto, 2009. "Healthy, educated and wealthy: A primer on the impact of public and private welfare expenditures on economic growth," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 946-956, December.
    9. Facchini, François & Melki, Mickaël, 2013. "Efficient government size: France in the 20th century," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 1-14.
    10. Joscha Beckmann & Marek Endrichs & Rainer Schweickert, 2016. "Government activity and economic growth – one size fits All?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 429-450, July.
    11. Brousseau, Eric & Schemeil, Yves & Sgard, Jérôme, 2010. "Bargaining on law and bureaucracies: A constitutional theory of development," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 253-266, September.
    12. Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 155-179, January.
    13. Bertarelli Silvia, 2006. "Public capital and growth," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 361-398.
    14. Robert Hamwey, 2005. "Expanding national policy space for development: Why the Multilateral Trading System must change," Development and Comp Systems 0511005, EconWPA.
    15. Sepp, Jüri, 2007. "Estland: Eine ordnungspolitische Erfolgsgeschichte?," Discourses in Social Market Economy 2007-02, OrdnungsPolitisches Portal (OPO).
    16. Regis Bonelli, 2009. "Estado de uma Nação: Textos de Apoio - Estado e Economia: Estado e E Crescimento Econômico no Brasil," Discussion Papers 1393, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
    17. Paul Dragos Aligica & Aura Matei, 2015. "National cultures, economic action and the homogeneity problem: insights from the case of Romania," Chapters,in: Culture and Economic Action, chapter 13, pages 295-317 Edward Elgar Publishing.

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