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Determinants of Institutional Quality: A Case Study of IMF Programme Countries

  • Javed, Omer

An attempt has been made to determine the variables that have a significant bearing on the economic and political institutional quality, taking a sample of member countries of IMF, especially focusing on the programme countries and prolonged users, during 1980-2012. Main results point towards a parliamentary form of government, governance and its related indicators, openness, freedom with regard to monetary, fiscal, investment and labour, and education as variables that significantly enhance institutional quality, while the presence of military in power, excessive strength of government and opposition in parliament, and foreign aid have a negative consequence for institutional quality.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 51344.

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Date of creation: 09 Nov 2013
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:51344
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