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Determinants of Institutional Quality: A Case Study of IMF Programme Countries


  • Javed, Omer


An attempt has been made to determine the variables that have a significant bearing on the economic and political institutional quality, taking a sample of member countries of IMF, especially focusing on the programme countries and prolonged users, during 1980-2012. Main results point towards a parliamentary form of government, governance and its related indicators, openness, freedom with regard to monetary, fiscal, investment and labour, and education as variables that significantly enhance institutional quality, while the presence of military in power, excessive strength of government and opposition in parliament, and foreign aid have a negative consequence for institutional quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Javed, Omer, 2013. "Determinants of Institutional Quality: A Case Study of IMF Programme Countries," MPRA Paper 51344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:51344

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Javed, Omer, 2014. "Institutional quality, macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth: a case study of IMF programme countries," MPRA Paper 56370, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item


    IMF; Economic Institutions; Political Institutions; Institutional Quality;

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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