Assessment of Institutional Quality in Resource-Rich Caspian Basin Countries
Natural resource dependence is believed to have potential impact on institutional development, and there is growing consensus in the academic literature that institutional weakness is central to the explanation of the negative effects of resource booms. Generally, the quality of institutional framework and natural resource dependence interact mutually. Natural resources rents can damage institutions by removing incentives to conduct reforms and even to establish a well-functioning bureaucracy. Also, weak institutional quality is the ultimate cause for a disadvantageous management framework of natural resources and process of converting revenue flows into economic development. This paper examines the connection between institutional quality and resource dependence in resource-rich Caspian Basin countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan) with transition economies. The analysis for the total natural resources rents suggests that, in aggregate, revenues on total natural resources have a negative impact on government effectiveness.
|Date of creation:||05 Jun 2013|
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