A Multi-Agent based Configuration Process for Mass Customization
Large product variety in mass customization involves a high internal complexity level inside a companyís operations, as well as a high external complexity level from a customerís perspective. In order to reach a competitive advantage through mass customization, it is necessary to cope with both problems. This is done within the scope of variety formation and variety steering tasks: Variety formation supports customers during the configuration task according to their preferences and knowledge, variety steering tasks internally deal with finding the customizerís optimal offer. Driven by this economic background, we present a comprehensive multi-agent based design for a configuration process in this paper. It is identified as a suitable solution approach integrating both perspectives. The mass customized products are assumed to be based on a modular architecture and each module variant is associated with an autonomous rational agent. Agents must compete with each other in order to join product variants which suit real customersí requirements. The negotiation process is based on a market mechanism supported by the target costing concept and a Dutch auction.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klemperer, Paul, 1999.
"Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2163, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Microeconomics 9903002, EconWPA.
- Klemperer, P., 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," Economics Papers 1999-w12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Economics Series Working Papers 1999-W12, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Houssein Ben-Ameur & Brahim Chaib-draa & Peter Kropf, 2002. "Multi-item Auctions for Automatic Negotiation," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-68, CIRANO.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5287. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.