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Multi-item Auctions for Automatic Negotiation

Author

Listed:
  • Houssein Ben-Ameur
  • Brahim Chaib-draa
  • Peter Kropf

Abstract

Available resources can often be limited with regard to the number of demands. In this paper we propose an approach for solving this problem which consists of using the mechanisms of multi-item auctions for allocating the resources to a set of software agents. We consider the resource problem as a market in which there are vendor agents and buyer agents trading on items representing the resources. These agents use multi-item auctions which are viewed here as a process of automatic negotiation, and implemented as a network of intelligent software agents. In this negotiation, agents exhibit different acquisition capabilities which let them act differently depending on the current context or situation of the market. For example, the "richer"" an agent is, the more items it can buy, i.e. the more resources it can acquire. We present a model for this approach based on the English auction, then we discuss experimental evidence of such a model." Dans un environnement multiagent, les ressources peuvent toujours s'avérer insuffisantes relativement à un nombre élevé de demandes. Dans ce cahier, nous proposons une approche mixant les enchères et les agents logiciels en vue de contribuer à résoudre ce problème. Cette approche consiste en fait à utiliser le mécanisme d'enchères multi-articles en vue d'allouer les ressources à un ensemble d'agents. À cet effet, nous considérons le problème de ressources comme un marché dans lequel évoluent des agents acheteurs et des agents vendeurs négociant des articles représentant des ressources. Ces agents utilisent des enchères multi-articles et par conséquent ils constituent un processus de négociation automatisé et programmé comme un réseau d'agents logiciels. Dans ce type de négociation, chaque agent exhibe différentes capacités d'acquisition lui permettant ainsi d'agir différemment selon le contexte ou la situation de marché. Par exemple, plus on est riche, plus on peut acheter d'articles. Nous présentons pour ce modèle une enchère anglaise et nous discuterons ses résultats expérimentaux.

Suggested Citation

  • Houssein Ben-Ameur & Brahim Chaib-draa & Peter Kropf, 2002. "Multi-item Auctions for Automatic Negotiation," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-68, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2002s-68
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2002s-68.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    2. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    4. J. Teich & H. Wallenius & J. Wallenius, 1998. "Multiple Issue Action and Market Algorithms for the World Wide Web," Working Papers ir98109, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    5. Yvan Lengwiler, 1999. "The multiple unit auction with variable supply," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(2), pages 373-392.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jack Hopkins & Özgür Kafali & Bedour Alrayes & Kostas Stathis, 2019. "Pirasa: strategic protocol selection for e-commerce agents," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 29(2), pages 239-252, June.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4472 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Blecker, Thorsten & Abdelkafi, Nizar & Kreutler, Gerold, 2004. "A Multi-Agent based Configuration Process for Mass Customization," MPRA Paper 5287, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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