Стратегии Институциональных Реформ: Перспективные Траектории
[Institutional Reform Strategies: Promising trajectories]
This is the first part of the research devoted to the problem of the choice of institutional reform strategies. A strategy is defined as a planned trajectory of institutional changes in time. Three types of strategies are compared: shock therapy, gradual growing, and interim institution strategy. A concept of a promising trajectory is introduced; this is a trajectory that has good chances to be successful since it meets a number of requirements. A promising trajectory has to be agreed with technological, resource and institutional constraints, and should provide built-in mechanisms to stimulate planned institutional changes and to prevent dysfunctions and institutional traps. In particular, such a trajectory has to take into account national cultural peculiarities, static and dynamic institutional complementarities, and political decision making mechanisms. It is necessary to restrain redistributive activities and envisage compensations to those who could lose due to reforms. Institutional changes have to be supported by measures directed to form positive institutional expectations, and by government policies stimulating economic growth. In the second part of the work, proposed analytical tools are implemented to compare reforms in Russia and China.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Economics and Mathematical Methods 1.42(2006): pp. 3-18|
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