IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Современное Состояние Теории Экономических Реформ
[Modern Condition of the Theory of Economic Reforms]

The Theory of Reform is a comparatively new branch of economic theory that studies processes of purposeful change of economic institutions. In the paper, we outline corresponding problems, and present some of the most important results of the Theory of Reform. Sources of reform costs as well as typical mistakes of reform makers are discussed. We develop a general view on a reform as a process of construction of an institutional trajectory that satisfies a number of requirements. Different reform strategies are compared.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 22032.

in new window

Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics of Contemporary Russia 1.40(2008): pp. 1-34
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:22032
Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2006. "Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(1), pages 37-74, 03.
  2. Gérard Roland, 2004. "Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026268148x, June.
  3. Li, David D, 1998. "Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 393-97, May.
  4. Saul Estrin & Jan Hanousek & Evzen Kocenda & Jan Svejnar, 2009. "The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 699-728, September.
  5. Weitzman Martin L. & Xu Chenggang, 1994. "Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 121-145, April.
  6. Castanheira, Micael & Roland, Gerard, 2000. "The Optimal Speed of Transition: A General Equilibrium Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 219-39, February.
  7. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2003. "Vertical Integration and Distance to Frontier," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 630-638, 04/05.
  8. Lawrence J. Lau & Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, 1997. "Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition," Working Papers 97048, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  9. David D. Li, 1998. "Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 130, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  10. Derek C Jones, 1998. "The Economic Effects of Privatization: Evidence from a Russian Panel," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(2), pages 75-102, July.
  11. Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gérard, 1993. "The Design of Reform Packages Under Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 860, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Vladimir Popov, 2006. "Shock Therapy Versus Gradualism Reconsidered: Lessons From Transition Economies After 15 Years Of Reforms," Working Papers w0068, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  13. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04.
  14. Aron, Janine, 2000. "Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 15(1), pages 99-135, February.
  15. Andrei Shleifer, 1996. "Government in Transition," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1783, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  16. Andrew Berg, 1994. "The Logistics of Privatization in Poland," NBER Chapters, in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: Restructuring, pages 165-188 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Simeon Djankov, 1999. "Ownership Structure and Enterprise Restructuring in Six Newly Independent States," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 41(1), pages 75-95, April.
  18. Kornai Janos, 1994. "Transformational Recession: The Main Causes," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 39-63, August.
  19. A. Chong & C. Calderón, 2000. "Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 69-81, 03.
  20. Joseph Stiglitz, 1998. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 3-22, Spring.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:22032. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.