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Ownership structure and enterprise restructuring in six newly independent states

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Listed author(s):
  • Djankov, Simeon

Abstract

The author investigates the relationship between ownership structure and enterprise restructuring in six newly independent states: Georgia, Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. He documents the changing pattern of ownership in 960 privatized manufacturing companies from 1995-97. There are large differences in ownership structure across countries, differences that seem to be determined by the method of privatization pursued. Enterprises in countries where the privatization programs favored incumbent managers (Georgia and Ukraine) ended with heavy ownership by managers (an average 53.6 percent and 46.2 percent respectively). Countries that used mainly the mass privatization approach (Kazakstan and the Kyrgyz Republic had the highest proportion of ownership shares held be outside investors (37 percent and 21.2 percent respectively). Foreign ownership is positively associated with enterprise restructuring at high ownership levels (above 30 percent of shares). By contrast, the relationship between management ownership by outside local investors or the state is not significantly correlated with restructuring.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2047.

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Date of creation: 28 Feb 1999
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2047
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Keywords: Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring; Economic Theory&Research; Banks&Banking Reform; Small and Medium Size Enterprises; International Terrorism&Counterterrorism; International Terrorism&Counterterrorism; Banks&Banking Reform; Municipal Financial Management; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring; Economic Theory&Research;

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