Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance
Tender offers provide an ideal setting for the analysis of agency relationships since the best interests of the principal (target firm shareholders) and agent (target firm managers) are often in conflict. Moreover, the actions and stated rationale of target managers in resisting or not resisting tender offers are readily observable, and the size of the possible agency costs is great. This research provides direct empirical evidence on the relationship between managerial welfare and takeover bid resistance. Tests on a sample of cash tender offers provide support for the managerial welfare hypothesis. The existence or absence of bid resistance is found to be directly related to the personal wealth changes of the target firm's managers. The relationships between managerial actions and bid premium size, bidder nationality, conglomerate offers, and "ex post settling up" are also examined.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 15 (1984)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:spring:p:54-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.