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Company Performance in Ukraine: What Governs its Success

  • Andreyeva Tatiana

    ()

The observable outcomes of post-Soviet economic reforms have generated large interest and controversy in the transition debate. Privatization and market competition are the two primary forces to induce changes in the firm behavior. The author investigates how firm performance responds to these forces by modeling firm performance in Ukraine. Drawing from panel data on Ukrainian firms for 1996–2000, the study estimates a production function using random-effects and instrumental variable estimators. The analysis finds evidence that firm performance improves significantly with privatization. This effect is particularly strong when several private owners concentrate ownership. There is indication that privatized companies with dominant outside shareholders are most efficient. Another finding is that market competition has little role in determining firm performance in Ukraine.

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Paper provided by EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS in its series EERC Working Paper Series with number 03-01e.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: 06 Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:03-01e
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  1. Nickell, S.J., 1993. "Competition and Crporate Performance," Economics Series Working Papers 99155, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  2. Ann P. Bartel & Ann E. Harrison, 1999. "Ownership versus Environment: Why are Public Sector Firms Inefficient?," NBER Working Papers 7043, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1997. "Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition," Munich Reprints in Economics 19772, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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  8. Maxim Boycko & Andrei Shlelfer & Robert Vishny, 1993. "Voucher Privatization," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 85, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  9. Dyck, I J Alexander, 1997. "Privatization in Eastern Germany: Management Selection and Economic Transition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 565-97, September.
  10. Stijn Claesens & Simeon Djankov & Gerhard Pohl, 1997. "Ownership and Corporate Governance : Evidence from the Czech Republic," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11584, The World Bank.
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  13. Blanchard, O. & Aghion, P., 1996. "On insider privatization," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 759-766, April.
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  15. Konings, Jozef, 1997. "Competition and Firm Performance in Transition Economies: Evidence from Firm Level Surveys in Slovenia, Hungary and Romania," CEPR Discussion Papers 1770, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Dutz, Mark & Hayri, Aydin, 1999. "Does More Intense Competition Lead to Higher Growth?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Megginson, William L & Nash, Robert C & van Randenborgh, Matthias, 1994. " The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 403-52, June.
  18. Klaus M. Schmidt, 1997. "Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 191-213.
  19. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1996. "A Theory of Privatisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 309-19, March.
  20. Estrin, Saul & Rosevear, Adam, 1999. "Enterprise performance and ownership: The case of Ukraine," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 1125-1136, April.
  21. Frydman, Roman & Gray, Cheryl W. & Hessel, Marek & Rapaczynski, Andrzej, 1997. "Private ownership and corporate performance : some lessons from transition economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1830, The World Bank.
  22. Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & John van Reenen, 1999. "Market Share, Market Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 529-554.
  23. Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & John van Reenen, 1999. "Market Share, Market Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 529-554.
  24. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
  25. Frydman, Roman & Gray, Cheryl & Hessel, Marek & Rapaczynski, Andrzej, 1997. "Private Ownership and Corporate Performance: Some Lessons from Transition Economies," Working Papers 97-28, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  26. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
  27. Philippe Aghion & Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Rey, 1999. "Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 825-852.
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