Общество Перманентного Перераспределения: Роль Реформ
[Permanent Redistribution Society: The Role of Reforms]
We discuss the typical mistakes in carrying out reforms that promote redistributive activities and give rise to redistribution cycles; each cycle includes the stages of reform, stabilization and recovery. We provide arguments that show that a possible way out of the institutional backwardness trap is a rational combination of institutional reforms and policies to stimulate economic growth.
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- David D. Li, 1998. "Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 130, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Andrew Berg, 1994. "The Logistics of Privatization in Poland," NBER Chapters, in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: Restructuring, pages 165-188 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Li, David D, 1998. "Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 393-97, May.
- Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
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