A Simple Test of the Effect of Interest Rate Defense
High interest rates to defend the exchange rate signal that a government is committed to fixed exchange rates, but may also signal weak fundamentals. We test the effectiveness of the interest rate defense by disaggregating into the effects on future interest rates differentials, expectations of future exchange rates, and risk premia. While much previous empirical work has been inconclusive due to offsetting effects, tests that "disaggregate" the effects provide significant information. Raising overnight interest rates strengthens the exchange rate over the short-term, but also leads to an expected depreciation at a horizon of a year and longer and an increase in the risk premium, consistent with the argument that it also signals weak fundamentals.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Drazen, Allan & Hubrich, Stefan, 2006. "A simple test of the effect of interest rate defense," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 612-636, December.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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