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Do high interest rates deter speculative attacks? - Evidence and some theory

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  • Grier, Kevin
  • Lin, Shu

Abstract

This paper presents the first empirical evidence on the efficacy of raising interest rates ex ante as a deterrent to speculative attacks. Using a dataset that covers 54 countries from March 1964 through December 2005, we find strong evidence that raising interest rates in advance has significantly different impacts in different country groups. It significantly reduces the probability of attacks in countries that have a de facto hard peg but increases it in de facto soft-pegging countries. This finding is robust to alternative measure of monetary policy and to different specifications and samples. We then present a simple two-stage signaling model to offer a theoretical explanation for our empirical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Grier, Kevin & Lin, Shu, 2010. "Do high interest rates deter speculative attacks? - Evidence and some theory," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 938-950, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:29:y:2010:i:5:p:938-950
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    Cited by:

    1. Ryota Nakatani, 2017. "The Effects of Productivity Shocks, Financial Shocks, and Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates: An Application of the Currency Crisis Model and Implications for Emerging Market Crises," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(11), pages 2545-2561, November.
    2. Farshid Pourshahabi & Nazar Dahmardeh, 2014. "The Effects of Economic Sanctions and Speculative Attacks on Inflation," Iranian Economic Review (IER), Faculty of Economics,University of Tehran.Tehran,Iran, vol. 18(3), pages 45-67, Autumn.
    3. Esaka, Taro, 2014. "Are consistent pegs really more prone to currency crises?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 136-163.

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