What Allotment and Subcontracting in Procurement Bidding
Allotment and subcontracting are the two alternative mechanisms enabling the participation of SMEs in procurement. We compare these two alternatives in the context of a procurement contract awarded by a first-price sealed-bid auction. When the winning large firm is constrained with respect to the degree of subcontracting, we show that only a reduction of the chosen SME's profit can reduce the expected cost of the contract. However, when the large firm is allowed to choose the subcontracting level, subcontracting can be a Pareto dominating mechanism, i.e. simultaneously increasing both firms' profits and reducing the expected total cost of the contract.
|Date of creation:||May 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne|
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- Pierre-Henri Morand, 2003.
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- François Marechal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2003. "Pre vs. post-award subcontracting plans in procurement bidding," Post-Print hal-01313446, HAL.
- François Marechal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2003. "Pre vs. post-award subcontracting plans in procurement bidding," Post-Print hal-01313424, HAL.
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