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An auction market for journal articles

  • Jens Prüfer
  • David Zetland


Economic articles are published very slowly. We believe this results mainly from the poor incentives referees face. We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting papers and demonstrate a strict Pareto-improvement of equilibrium. Besides the benefits of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. In addition, the "academic dollars" for papers sold at auction go to the authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This income indicates academic productivity (facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion); its recirculation to journals further stimulates quality competition.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 145 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 379-403

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:145:y:2010:i:3:p:379-403
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