Publishing as Prostitution? Choosing Between Oneï¿½s Own Ideas and Academic Failure
Survival in academia depends on publications in refereed journals. Authors only get their papers accepted if they intellectually prostitute themselves by slavishly following the demands made by anonymous referees without property rights on the journals they advise. Intellectual prostitution is neither beneficial to suppliers nor consumers. But it is avoidable. The editor (with property rights on the journal) should make the basic decision of whether a paper is worth publishing or not. The referees only give suggestions on how to improve the paper. The author may disregard this advice. This reduces intellectual prostitution and produces more original publications.
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