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Informal Insurance Arrangements in Ghanaian Migrants' Transnational Networks: The Role of Reverse Remittances and Geographic Proximity

  • Mazzucato, Valentina
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    Summary Risk pooling literature argues the need for geographic proximity to ensure the functioning of informal insurance arrangements. This paper investigates whether these arrangements exist between migrants and their network members back home and, if so, how they work in the absence of geographic proximity. Analysis of a simultaneous matched sample of migrants in the Netherlands and network members in Ghana reveals the existence of reverse remittances. These remittances show that there is risk pooling between migrants and network members. The paper elaborates on the institutional arrangements that make such a system possible.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.

    Volume (Year): 37 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 6 (June)
    Pages: 1105-1115

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:37:y:2009:i:6:p:1105-1115
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

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