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NIT picking: The macroeconomic effects of a Negative Income Tax

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  • Lopez-Daneri, Martin

Abstract

I study a revenue-neutral reform of the U.S. income tax and welfare system that involves the adoption of a Negative Income Tax (NIT). The reform is undertaken in a life-cycle economy with individual heterogeneity and uninsurable idiosyncratic labor risk. The optimal NIT consists of a 22% rate and a transfer equivalent to 11% of per-capita GDP. The ex-ante average welfare gain is a 2.1% annual increase of individual consumption. I show that a NIT outperforms a flat tax reform (income tax plus deduction) by a considerable margin. The key consequence of the reform is that high-productivity agents increase their relative importance in the labor supply at the expense of low-productivity agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Lopez-Daneri, Martin, 2016. "NIT picking: The macroeconomic effects of a Negative Income Tax," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 1-16.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:68:y:2016:i:c:p:1-16
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2016.04.008
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    Cited by:

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    2. Rauh, Christopher & Rodrigues dos Santos, Marcelo, 2022. "How do transfers and universal basic income impact the labor market and inequality?," CEPR Discussion Papers 16993, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Nezih Guner & Martin Lopez-Daneri & Gustavo Ventura, 2023. "The Looming Fiscal Reckoning: Tax Distortions, Top Earners, and Revenues," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 50, pages 146-170, October.
    4. Juan Carlos Conesa & Bo Li & Qian Li, 2020. "Universal Basic Income and Progressive Consumption Taxes," Department of Economics Working Papers 20-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    5. Daniel R. Carroll & Andre Luduvice & Eric Young, 2023. "Optimal Fiscal Reform with Many Taxes," Working Papers 23-07R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, revised 28 Aug 2024.
    6. Conesa, Juan Carlos & Li, Bo & Li, Qian, 2020. "Welfare implications of switching to consumption taxation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    7. Jaimovich, Nir & Saporta-Eksten, Itay & Setty, Ofer & Yedid-Levi, Yaniv, 2022. "Universal Basic Income: Inspecting the Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 16996, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Axelle Ferriere & Philipp Grubener & Gaston Navarro & Oliko Vardishvili, 2021. "Larger transfers financed with more progressive taxes? On the optimal design of taxes and transfers," Working Papers halshs-03466762, HAL.
    9. Ugo Colombino & Nizamul Islam, 2025. "Lost jobs, new jobs and optimal tax-transfer reforms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 64(4), pages 765-818, June.
    10. Coelho, José, 2020. "Universal basic income and skill-biased technological change," MPRA Paper 99195, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Mar 2020.
    11. Conesa, Juan Carlos & Li, Bo & Li, Qian, 2023. "A quantitative evaluation of universal basic income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
    12. Raei, Sepideh, 2020. "Gradual tax reforms: If you like it, you can keep it," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    13. Axelle Ferriere & Philipp Grübener & Gaston Navarro & Oliko Vardishvili, 2023. "On the Optimal Design of Transfers and Income Tax Progressivity," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(2), pages 276-333.
    14. Hasumi, Ryo & Takano, Tetsuaki, 2025. "Comparing the earned income tax credit and universal basic income in a heterogeneous agent model," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 238-247.
    15. Rachel Moore & Brandon Pecoraro, 2021. "A Tale of Two Bases: Progressive Taxation of Capital and Labor Income," Public Finance Review, , vol. 49(3), pages 335-391, May.
    16. Suzuki, Tomoya, 2021. "Basic income, wealth inequality and welfare: A proposed case in New Zealand," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 118-128.

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    JEL classification:

    • E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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