Content
July 2008, Volume 136, Issue 1
- 69-86 A simple way of estimating interest group ideology
by Amy McKay - 87-101 Does restricting choice in referenda enable governments to spend more?
by Randall Holcombe & Lawrence Kenny - 103-122 Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?
by Frode Brevik & Manfred Gärtner - 123-138 Do fiscal rules cause budgetary outcomes?
by Signe Krogstrup & Sébastien Wälti - 139-164 Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis
by Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Rainer Thiele - 165-180 Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate
by Aggey Semenov - 181-200 Auctions or grandfathering: the political economy of tradable emission permits
by Yu-Bong Lai - 201-213 A distributive N-amendment game with endogenous agenda formation
by Elizabeth Penn - 215-239 Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform
by Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann - 241-244 Adrian Vermeule. Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small
by Christopher Coyne - 245-247 Terry L. Anderson, Bruce L. Benson, & Thomas E. Flanagan, eds., Self-Determination: The Other Path for Native Americans
by Edward Stringham - 249-251 Alain Marciano and Jean-Michel Josselin (eds.): Democracy, Freedom, and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach
by Benjamin Powell - 253-254 John H. Aldrich, James E. Alt, and Arthur Lupia, Positive Changes in Political Science: The Legacy of Richard D. McKelvey’s Most Influential Writings
by Arthur Denzau & Ravi Roy
June 2008, Volume 135, Issue 3
- 89-90 The vote motive
by Gordon Tullock - 91-107 Using state-level simulations in a political economy model of US trade policy
by Hugh Arce & Robert Koopman & Marinos Tsigas - 109-123 How does ideology matter in the spatial model of voting?
by Garrett Beeler Asay - 125-130 A stochastic derivation of the ratio form of contest success functions
by Hao Jia - 131-150 Partisan politics and stock market performance: The effect of expected government partisanship on stock returns in the 2002 German federal election
by Roland Füss & Michael Bechtel - 151-164 Liberalization and rent-seeking in China’s labor market
by John Bishop & Haiyong Liu - 165-182 The second-order dilemma of public goods and capital accumulation
by Akira Okada - 183-205 Political freedom, economic freedom, and income convergence: Do stages of economic development matter?
by Zhenhui Xu & Haizheng Li - 207-223 Political instability and inflation volatility
by Ari Aisen & Francisco Veiga - 225-236 Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information
by Mark Fey - 237-255 Going once, going twice, sold! The committee assignment process as an all-pay auction
by Daniel Lee - 257-276 Social preferences and private provision of public goods: A ‘double critical mass’ model
by Angelo Antoci & Pier Sacco & Luca Zarri - 277-289 Step return versus net reward in the voluntary provision of a threshold public good: An adversarial collaboration
by Charles Cadsby & Rachel Croson & Melanie Marks & Elizabeth Maynes - 291-300 Influencing rent-seeking contests
by Robert Ritz - 301-317 Taxation and presidential approval: separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence?
by Benny Geys & Jan Vermeir - 319-336 Supersized votes: ballot length, uncertainty, and choice in direct legislation elections
by Peter Selb - 337-352 US presidential elections and real GDP growth, 1961–2004
by Kevin Grier - 353-373 Making the first move
by Hanna Bäck & Patrick Dumont - 375-397 The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror
by Jean-Paul Azam & Véronique Thelen - 399-413 Functional unpleasantness: the evolutionary logic of righteous resentment
by William Heller & K. Sieberg - 415-448 Trending economic factors and the structure of Congress in the growth of government, 1930–2002
by Stanley Winer & Michael Tofias & Bernard Grofman & John Aldrich - 449-468 Electoral politics and monetary policy: does the Bank of Canada contribute to a political business cycle?
by J. Ferris - 469-484 Swing and a myth: a review of Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter
by Loren Lomasky - 485-487 Reflections on Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter
by Gordon Tullock - 489-492 John Samples. The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform
by William Anderson - 493-496 Peter Emerson, ed., Designing an All-Inclusive Democracy: Consensual Voting Procedures For Use in Parliaments, Councils and Committees
by Joel Parker - 497-499 Mark Gradstein and Kai A. Konrad (Eds.) Institutions and Norms in Economic Development
by Mwangi Kimenyi - 501-503 Peter Bernholz and Roland Vaubel (eds.): Political competition and economic regulation
by Horst Feldmann
April 2008, Volume 135, Issue 1
- 1-2 Gordon Tullock’s Contribution to spontaneous order studies
by Peter Boettke - 3-10 Maximizing behavior & market forces: the microfoundations of spontaneous order theorizing in Gordon Tullock’s contributions to Smithian political economy
by Peter Boettke - 11-22 The Politics of Bureaucracy and the failure of post-war reconstruction
by Christopher Coyne - 23-34 Gordon Tullock’s The Organization of Inquiry: A critical appraisal
by Bruce Caldwell - 35-53 Spontaneous order and the common law: Gordon Tullock’s critique
by Todd Zywicki - 55-66 Finding social dilemma: West of Babel, not east of Eden
by Richard Wagner - 67-78 Coordination without command: Stretching the scope of spontaneous order
by Peter Leeson - 79-88 Thinking about order without thought: the lifetime contributions of Gordon Tullock
by Michael Munger
March 2008, Volume 134, Issue 3
- 139-146 Rational benevolence in small committees
by Derek Clark & Christian Riis - 147-161 What makes fiscal consolidations last? A survival analysis of budget cuts in Europe (1960–2004)
by Reyes Illera & Carlos Mulas-Granados - 163-178 Public pensions and return migration
by Tim Krieger - 179-199 Extension of the portfolio allocation model to surplus majority governments: a fuzzy approach
by Terry Clark & Jennifer Larson & John Mordeson & Mark Wierman - 201-229 The political legislation cycle
by Francesco Lagona & Fabio Padovano - 231-246 A power measure analysis of Amendment 36 in Colorado
by Claus Beisbart & Luc Bovens - 247-254 Voting to anger and to please others
by Amihai Glazer - 255-262 The optimal jury size when jury deliberation follows a random walk
by Eric Helland & Yaron Raviv - 263-292 The impact of globalization on the composition of government expenditures: Evidence from panel data
by Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Heinrich Ursprung - 293-305 The extent of the population paradox in the Hungarian electoral system
by Attila Tasnádi - 307-328 Economic freedom and entrepreneurial activity: Some cross-country evidence
by Christian Bjørnskov & Nicolai Foss - 329-346 Income inequality and economic freedom in the U.S. states
by Nathan Ashby & Russell Sobel - 347-366 Provoking a civil war
by Lorenzo Rocco & Zié Ballo - 367-389 An economic or political Kuznets curve?
by Henry Tam - 391-417 Female voting power: the contribution of women’s suffrage to the growth of social spending in Western Europe (1869–1960)
by Toke Aidt & Bianca Dallal - 419-427 Optimal taxation and economic growth: a comment
by Roderick Hill - 429-443 Performance and prize decomposition in contests
by Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan & Mordechai Schwarz - 445-462 The choice of insurance in the labor market
by Michael Neugart - 463-488 Does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth? Theory and evidence from 75 aid-recipient countries
by George Economides & Sarantis Kalyvitis & Apostolis Philippopoulos - 489-490 A rejoinder to “A commentary on ‘Does the Fed contribute to a political business cycle?’ ”
by Burton Abrams - 491-493 Edward Stringham, ed., Anarchy, State and Public Choice
by Daniel Sutter - 495-500 New publications
by Michael Munger - 501-504 Henry H. Bauer. The Origin, Persistence and Failings of HIV/AIDS Theory
by William Shughart
January 2008, Volume 134, Issue 1
- 1-13 Introduction: Blogs, politics and power: a special issue of Public Choice
by Daniel Drezner & Henry Farrell - 15-30 The power and politics of blogs
by Henry Farrell & Daniel Drezner - 31-46 Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in China
by Rebecca MacKinnon - 47-65 Meet the bridgebloggers
by Ethan Zuckerman - 67-86 Cross-ideological discussions among conservative and liberal bloggers
by Eszter Hargittai & Jason Gallo & Matthew Kane - 87-95 Neither Hayek nor Habermas
by Cass Sunstein - 97-108 What do bloggers do: an average day on an average political blog
by Laura McKenna & Antoinette Pole - 109-123 New competencies in democratic communication? Blogs, agenda setting and political participation
by Deva Woodly - 125-138 Blogging and political information: truth or truthiness?
by Michael Munger
December 2007, Volume 133, Issue 3
- 259-267 Opaque rather than transparent: Why the public cannot monitor monetary policy
by Michael Belongia - 269-273 Federal Reserve transparency: The more things change, the more they stay the same?
by Rob McGregor - 275-295 Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis
by Roland Vaubel & Axel Dreher & Uğurlu Soylu - 297-319 Do political variables affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions? New empirical evidence
by Jochen Mierau & Richard Jong-A-Pin & Jakob de Haan - 321-341 Tax policies in a globalized world: Is it politics after all?
by Antonis Adam & Pantelis Kammas - 343-358 Interest group activity and long-run stock market performance
by Dennis Coates & Bonnie Wilson - 359-375 Rank injustice?: How the scoring method for cross-country running competitions violates major social choice principles
by Thomas Hammond - 377-391 Determinants of interest group formation
by Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson - 393-415 The effect of monetary unification on public debt and its real return
by Roel Beetsma & Koen Vermeylen - 417-437 Electoral cycles in the administration of criminal justice
by Andrew Dyke - 439-456 The social sub-optimality of competitive elections
by Justin Buchler - 457-477 The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy
by Linda Veiga & Maria Pinho - 479-494 Legislative term limits and state spending
by H. Erler - 495-495 Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice
by Randall Holcombe - 497-498 Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting rules: The potential for public choice
by Robert Tollison - 499-501 Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice
by Roger Congleton - 503-505 Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice
by Martin Ricketts
October 2007, Volume 133, Issue 1
- 1-11 The merits of Neo-Downsian modeling of the alternative vote: A reply to Horowitz
by Jon Fraenkel & Bernard Grofman - 13-23 Where have all the parties gone? Fraenkel and Grofman on the alternative vote – yet again
by Donald Horowitz - 25-29 Individual rationality and bargaining
by Abraham Diskin & Dan Felsenthal - 31-40 Political extremism in the presence of a free rider problem
by Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz - 41-55 Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations: an empirical analysis
by Joaquín Artés & Enrique Viñuela - 57-72 The political economy linkage between trade liberalization and domestic environmental regulations
by Yu-Bong Lai - 73-90 The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men
by Aki Lehtinen - 91-105 Election campaign resource allocation
by David Yi - 107-110 Campaign finance reform and electoral competition: Comment
by Thomas Stratmann & Francisco Aparicio-Castillo - 111-128 Explaining legislators’ positions on outside income limits: Voting on honoraria ceilings in the U.S. Senate, 1981–1983
by Beth Rosenson - 129-145 Blood and ink! The common-interest-game between terrorists and the media
by Dominic Rohner & Bruno Frey - 147-155 An analysis of rent-seeking games with relative-payoff maximizers
by Thomas Riechmann - 157-169 Justifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation
by Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters - 171-198 Monopoly rights in the privatization of telephone firms
by Bruno Viani - 199-229 Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi - 231-251 Kyoto Protocol cooperation: Does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying?
by Per Fredriksson & Eric Neumayer & Gergely Ujhelyi - 253-256 Edward P. Stringham, ed., Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice
by Peter Leeson - 257-258 Barry G. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
by Randall Holcombe
September 2007, Volume 132, Issue 3
- 255-256 Editorial announcement
by William Shughart & Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard & Michael Munger - 257-271 Understanding the development of fundamentalism
by Gil Epstein & Ira Gang - 273-289 Motivation of politicians and long-term policies
by Markus Müller - 291-304 Nonexpert beliefs about the macroeconomic consequences of economic and noneconomic events
by Michael Roos - 305-318 A distributional theory of government growth
by Holger Strulik - 319-332 Colluding victims: A public choice analysis of international alliances
by Philip Jones - 333-352 Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance
by Roger Congleton - 353-366 Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games
by T. Ahn & Myungsuk Lee & Lore Ruttan & James Walker - 367-400 The paradox of legal harmonization
by Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi - 401-420 A minimax procedure for electing committees
by Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver - 421-432 Reduce transaction costs? Yes. Strengthen property rights? Maybe: The First Nations Land Management Act and economic development on Canadian Indian reserves
by Christopher Alcantara - 433-436 A commentary on “Does the Fed contribute to a political business cycle?”
by Jerry Tempelman - 437-456 An empirical test of why incumbents adopt campaign spending limits
by Thomas Evans - 457-470 Local choice of property taxation: evidence from Norway
by Jon Fiva & Jørn Rattsø - 471-484 How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?
by Helge Berger & Till Mueller - 485-502 Dupuit, Pigou and cost of inefficiency in public services provision
by António Afonso & Vítor Gaspar - 503-504 Neoliberalism: National and Regional Experiments with Global Ideas
by Michael Munger - 505-507 The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861–1865
by Jeffrey Hummel - 509-511 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity
by Roger Congleton
July 2007, Volume 132, Issue 1
- 1-1 A further partial changing of the guard
by Charles Rowley & Robert Tollison - 3-5 Old wine, new wine
by Robert Tollison - 7-26 Israel and Palestine: the slow road to peace or the fast track to mutual annihilation?
by Charles Rowley & Michael Webb - 27-47 Citizen-candidate mobility and endogenous local policy
by Oliver Lorz & Stanislav Nastassine - 49-64 Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players
by Dmitry Ryvkin - 65-84 Strikes are more common in countries with majoritarian electoral systems
by Kåre Vernby - 85-102 Enlargement processes and distributional conflicts: The politics of discriminatory membership in the European Union
by Christina Schneider - 103-112 The persuasive power of a Committee Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC
by Henry Chappell & Rob McGregor & Todd Vermilyea - 113-123 Ambiguous political power and contest efforts
by Gil Epstein & Igal Milchtaich & Shmuel Nitzan & Mordechai Schwarz - 125-136 Business cycle and political election outcomes: Evidence from the Chilean democracy
by Rodrigo Cerda & Rodrigo Vergara - 137-157 Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits
by Edward López & R. Jewell - 159-178 A race to liberalization? Diffusion of economic policy reform among OECD-economies
by Hans Pitlik - 179-189 Who are the expressive voters?
by Stephen Drinkwater & Colin Jennings - 191-208 Strategic ratification
by Macartan Humphreys - 209-230 Public sector corruption and major earthquakes: A potentially deadly interaction
by Monica Escaleras & Nejat Anbarci & Charles Register - 231-246 Candidate uncertainty, mental models, and complexity: Some experimental results
by Michael Ensley & Scott Marchi & Michael Munger - 247-249 The Logic of Democracy
by John Merrifield - 251-254 Book Review
by Michael Munger
June 2007, Volume 131, Issue 3
- 259-280 Economic and security consequences of supreme values
by Arye Hillman - 281-292 Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered
by Jakob Haan - 293-313 The effectiveness of institutional borrowing restrictions: Empirical evidence from Spanish municipalities
by Fermín Cabasés & Pedro Pascual & Jaime Vallés - 315-331 Outsourcing in contests
by Frode Meland & Odd Straume - 333-344 The turnout ‘gap’ and the costs of voting – a comparison of participation at the 2001 general and 2002 local elections in England
by Colin Rallings & Michael Thrasher - 345-350 Political economy of the U.S. temporary duty suspension program: An empirical note
by Omer Gokcekus & Amber Barth - 351-364 Choosing a runoff election threshold
by Jeffrey O’Neill - 365-386 Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario
by Kevin Morrison - 387-411 Does political knowledge increase turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general election
by Valentino Larcinese - 413-434 The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do “moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?
by Samuel Merrill & James Adams - 435-451 Changing minds? Not in Congress!
by Keith Poole - 453-464 Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest
by Lambert Schoonbeek - 465-468 Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
by Richard Potthoff & Steven Brams - 469-489 Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections
by Gil Epstein & Raphaël Franck - 491-499 Goods or resource contests?
by Martin Kolmar - 501-503 David F. Prindle, The Paradox of Democratic Capitalism: Politics and Economics in American Thought. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. USD 49.95 (cloth)
by Randall Holcombe - 505-507 Beyond conventional economics: The limits of rational behaviour in political decision making
by Bryan Caplan
April 2007, Volume 131, Issue 1
- 1-21 Lobbying, corruption and political influence
by Nauro Campos & Francesco Giovannoni - 23-44 Government transparency and policymaking
by Justin Fox - 45-64 Political business cycles at the municipal level
by Linda Veiga & Francisco Veiga - 65-81 Reinforcement vs. change: The political influence of the media
by Ascensión Andina-Díaz - 83-99 Flags of our fathers: Voting on Confederate symbols in the State of Georgia
by Michael Reksulak & Gökhan Karahan & William Shughart - 101-116 Immigration and income redistribution: A political economy analysis
by Karin Mayr - 117-125 Legislature size and government spending in Italian regions: Forecasting the effects of a reform
by Nadia Fiorino & Roberto Ricciuti - 127-140 Inefficient households and the mix of government spending
by Dan Anderberg - 141-155 Political support and tax reforms with an application to Italy
by Paola Profeta - 157-175 The growth effects of fiscal policy in Greece 1960–2000
by Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos - 177-195 The charitable activities of terrorist organizations
by Pierre-Emmanuel Ly - 197-215 Evidence on voter preferences from unrestricted choice referendums
by Randall Holcombe & Lawrence Kenny - 217-242 Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation
by Per Fredriksson & Daniel Millimet - 243-247 The Walsh contract for central bankers proves optimal after all!
by Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller - 249-251 Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative: The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism
by Robert Lawson - 253-255 William A. Fischel, ed., The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2006, xxi + 339 pages. USD 30.00 (paper)
by Thomas McCaleb
March 2007, Volume 130, Issue 3
- 251-266 Organized crime and the 1960 presidential election
by John Binder - 267-292 The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world
by Christian Bjørnskov & Axel Dreher & Justina Fischer - 293-310 Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence
by John Patty & Roberto Weber - 311-328 Public versus private production and economies of scale
by Henrik Christoffersen & Martin Paldam & Allan Würtz - 329-335 Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment
by Johannes Münster - 337-346 Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation
by Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi - 347-362 A sheriff, two bullets and three problems
by Mike Felgenhauer - 363-380 Does capital mobility reduce the corporate-labor tax ratio?
by Peter Schwarz - 381-393 Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental policy
by Per Fredriksson & Jim Wollscheid - 395-400 1 dictator=2 voters
by Antonio Quesada - 401-436 A nonlinear principal component analysis of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance in the European Union
by Francesco Lagona & Fabio Padovano - 437-456 Why party and how much? The Soviet State and the party finance
by Eugenia Belova & Valery Lazarev