Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/s/kap/pubcho26.html
Content
March 1969, Volume 6, Issue 1
- 71-92 Candidate selection and voting behavior in France
by Howard Rosenthal & Subrata Sen - 93-98 A note on “graph-theoretic approaches to the theory of social choice”
by George Lady - 99-101 A note on a cyclical majority problem
by David Klingaman - 103-104 Charitable exploitation
by Wilson Schmidt - 105-114 Reviews
by Kenneth Arrow & Roger Sherman
September 1968, Volume 5, Issue 1
- 1-17 A public choice approach to public utility pricing (1)
by James Buchanan - 19-37 Models of the working of a two-party electoral system Part II
by David Chapman - 39-58 The marginal utility of a vote commitment
by James Coleman - 59-72 On the power and importance of the mean preference in a mathematical model of democratic choice
by Otto Davis & Melvin Hinich - 73-85 Participatory democracy in the community action program
by Madelyn Kafoglis - 87-104 Some postulated effects of learning on constitutional behavior
by Elinor Ostrom - 105-107 Note on a Pareto-optimal decision process
by Mary Eysenbach - 109-112 A Pareto optimal group decision process: A reply
by Earl Thompson - 113-120 An estimate of import surplus under a disequilibrium system
by Donald Huddle - 121-124 Public finance textbooks: A view from political science
by William Mitchell - 125-129 Reviews
by J. Davis & Lawrence Officer
March 1968, Volume 4, Issue 1
- 3-17 Economic analysis of the non-profit institution — The case of the private university
by Ferdinand Levy - 19-33 Economic growth in a democracy: A model
by Bruno Frey - 35-47 Graph-theoretic approaches to the theory of social choice
by Michael Taylor - 49-58 Potential costs of alternative decision-making rules
by Herbert Kiesling - 59-66 Riker's method for assessing the significance of roll call votes
by William Yohe - 67-79 Do freely competitive markets misallocate charity? A comment on Tullock's analysis
by Earl Thompson & Gordon Tullock - 81-88 Review
by Richard Wagner & James Buchanan
January 1967, Volume 3, Issue 1
- 1-17 The central argument in Lewis Carroll's The Principles of Parliamentary Representation
by Duncan Black - 19-37 Models of the working of a two-party electoral system — I
by David Chapman - 39-47 Should “public goods” be public?
by Francesco Forte - 49-66 The rationale of revolt
by Thomas Ireland - 67-83 The peculiar economics of disaster
by Howard Kunreuther - 85-90 A utility analysis of post-disaster co-operation
by Louis Alessi - 91-92 On paradigms in political science and economics
by Lewis Froman - 93-96 The Rand-Parkinson effect
by Gordon Tullock - 97-105 Book review
by Gordon Tullock & Louis Alessi & Joseph Spengler & Mark Pauley
December 1967, Volume 2, Issue 1
- 1-10 Fiscal policy and fiscal preference
by James Buchanan - 11-26 Ethics and game theory: The prisoner's dilemma
by R. Cunningham - 27-44 Constitutional asymmetry
by David Tuerck - 45-59 A method for finding “acceptable proposals” in group decision processes
by Charles Plott - 61-70 Alternative voting rules and local expenditure: The town-meeting vs. city
by Harvey Wheeler - 71-89 A rational theory of the federal budgeting process
by Oliver Williamson - 91-101 A note on supplemental appropriations in the federal budgetary process
by Gary Bowman & Otto Davis & Henry Gailliot & Alan Hess - 103-104 Review
by Roger Sherman - 105-118 Bibliography of recent works in non-market decision making
by Mark Pauly
December 1966, Volume 1, Issue 1
- 1-1 Preface
by Gordon Tullock - 1-48 A simple theory of non-cooperative games with ordinal utilities (1)
by Duncan Black - 49-62 Individual interests and collective action
by James Coleman - 63-132 On the process of budgeting: An empirical study of congressional appropriation
by Otto Davis & M. Dempster & Aaron Wildavsky - 133-140 A pareto optimal group decision process
by E. Thompson - 141-159 Information without profit
by Gordon Tullock - 161-170 Pressure groups and political entrepreneurs: A review article
by Richard Wagner