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Content
September 1974, Volume 19, Issue 1
- 139-150 Reviews
by Anatol Rapoport & Howard Tuckman & John Ferejohn & Bruce Buchanan & Robert Butterworth
June 1974, Volume 18, Issue 1
- 1-23 Game-theoretic models of bloc-voting under proportional representation
by Howard Rosenthal - 25-40 Artificial markets and the theory of games
by W. Montgomery - 41-66 Cycles of risk
by Richard McKelvey & Jeff Richelson - 67-81 Voting behavior and aggregate policy targets
by Susan Lepper - 83-92 On social restriction of individual freedom
by Rubin Saposnik - 93-105 The calculus of rational choice
by William Stratmann - 107-126 Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior
by Martin McGuire - 127-131 Reviews
by John Chamberlin & Gordon Tullock
March 1974, Volume 17, Issue 1
- 1-10 On money, votes, and policy in a democratic society
by Uri Ben-Zion & Zeev Eytan - 11-25 When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be
by Steven Brams & John Heilman - 27-47 Toward a general theory of managerial discretion
by Jean-Luc Migué & Gérard Bélanger & William Niskanen - 49-62 Some observations on the political economy of property tax reform
by Ralph Miner - 63-71 Political revolution and repression: An economic approach
by Morris Silver - 73-83 A description and explanation of citizen participation in a canadian municipality
by Mark Sproule-Jones - 85-91 Bargaining costs and social choice under uncertainty
by A. Pinto Barbosa - 93-97 Pareto optimal growth
by John Blair & Walter Chatfield - 99-101 Hegel on the calculus of voting
by James Buchanan - 103-106 Economic competition and political competition: Comments and corrections
by Noel Edelson - 107-109 The size principle and collective-consumption payoffs to political coalitions
by Thomas McCaleb - 111-113 Dynamic consistency in constitutions
by John Yeabsley - 115-129 Reviews
by Donald Wittman & Bruno Frey & Richard Rosett & Ray Whitman & Gordon Tullock & David Marwick & John Wanat & George Furstenberg & Oran Young
September 1973, Volume 16, Issue 1
- 1-15 Efficiency in the provision of fire services
by Rogers Ahlbrandt - 17-26 Democratic organization: A preliminary mathematical model
by Raphael Kazmann - 27-41 Normative assumptions in the study of public choice
by Duncan MacRae - 43-50 A note on the empirical nature of the taxpayer rebellion
by John Mikesell & John Blair - 51-58 Is the act of voting rational?
by Yoram Barzel & Eugene Silberberg - 59-71 Some simple economics of voting and not voting
by R. Tollison & T. Willett - 73-75 A note on collective goods and the theory of political entrepreneurship
by Jeffrey Richelson - 77-80 The rhodesian constitution and predictions for political stability
by Ewen Wilson - 81-89 The economic theory of politics: A survey of german contributions
by Bruno Frey & Rene Frey - 91-97 Reviews
by James Buchanan & Winston Bush & Louis Alessi & Warren Samuels - 98-98 Collective Goods and Collective Decision Mechanisms
by Richard Auster & Morris Silver
June 1973, Volume 15, Issue 1
- 1-1 Editor's note
by Gordon Tullock - 1-17 Indifference, alientation and rational decisions
by Richard Brody & Benjamin Page - 19-48 Stable outcomes in majority rule voting games
by Judith Sloss - 49-75 An economic approach to social choice
by Trout Rader - 77-85 Measuring power in voting bodies
by Harvey Kushner & Arnold Urken - 87-95 Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities
by Peter Bernholz - 97-102 The hunting of the paradox
by Roger Marz & Thomas Casstevens & Harold Casstevens - 103-117 The paradox of voting
by Thomas Hansen & Barry Prince - 119-119 Communications
by I. Good
March 1973, Volume 14, Issue 1
- 1-17 Collective goods and collective decision mechanisms
by Richard Auster & Morris Silver - 19-42 The control of politicians: An economic model
by Robert Barro - 43-67 Pareto desirable redistribution: The non-altruistic dimension
by Geoffrey Brennan - 69-82 The institutional structure of externality
by James Buchanan - 83-99 On the incentives of regulators: The case of taxicabs
by Ross Eckert - 101-107 A diagrammatic exposition of an economic theory of imperialism
by Paul Roberts & Alvin Rabushka - 109-116 A note on revenue sharing and the theory of public expenditures
by Sidney Carroll - 117-123 Welfare effects of announcing election forecasts
by Kenneth Brown & Charles Zech - 125-132 Poll positions and win probabilities: a stochastic model of the electoral process
by Jerry Medler & Donald Tull - 133-136 The appeal of minimum wage laws and the invisible hand in government
by Frank Steindl - 137-142 Cheating and control
by Charles Nichols & Donald Wittman - 143-154 The public choice theory of murray N. Rothbard, a modern anarchist
by H. Frech - 155-165 Reviews
by Melville McMillan & Robert Ross & Paul Portney & Eugene Swimmer
September 1972, Volume 13, Issue 1
- 1-19 Benevolence, malevolence and economic theory
by George Daly & J. Giertz - 21-29 Consensus or conflict: Alternative strategies for the bureaucratic bargainer
by David Davis - 31-46 An economic approach to riot analysis
by J. Gunning - 47-54 On division of the question
by Joseph Kadane - 55-79 The social gains from exchanging votes: A simulation approach
by Dennis Mueller & Geoffrey Philpotts & Jaroslav Vanek - 81-90 Serving the elderly?—an illustration of the niskanen effect
by Richard Sterne & Alvin Rabushka & Helen Scott - 91-106 Economic competition and political competition
by George Stigler - 107-111 Manuscripts in the maelstrom: A theory of the editorial process
by Alice Vandermeulen - 113-122 Political participation and income level: An exchange
by Keith Russell & John Fraser & Bruno Frey - 123-128 Rawls on justice as fairness
by James Buchanan - 129-147 Reviews
by William Havard & Gordon Tullock & William Riker & David Johnson & T. Tideman & George Daly & John Moorhouse & Jon Sonstelie
March 1972, Volume 12, Issue 1
- 1-11 Choice, faith, and politics: The political economy of hutterian communes
by John Baden & Richard Stroup - 13-33 The choice of monetary instruments and the theory of bureaucracy
by John Chant & Keith Acheson - 35-41 The politician's dilemma: What to represent
by Thomas Ireland - 43-55 Exclusion costs and the provision of public goods
by Morton Kamien & Nancy Schwartz - 57-68 Representative democracy via random selection
by Dennis Mueller & Robert Tollison & Thomas Willett - 69-87 A social choice model of the California feather river project
by Norman Plotkin - 89-109 Federal open market committee decisions in a markov process
by William Yohe - 111-111 A note on cyclical majorities
by Edgar Browning - 113-114 A note on some generalizations of the paradox of cyclical majorities
by Bernard Grofman - 115-118 A suggestion on the positive theory of redistribution
by Joseph Newhouse - 119-126 Reviews
by Gordon Tullock & James Buchanan
September 1971, Volume 11, Issue 1
- 1-16 Principles of urban fiscal strategy
by James Buchanan - 17-33 Multipart pricing of public goods
by Edward Clarke - 35-60 Internal processes governing party positions in elections
by James Coleman - 61-72 A linear programming approach to the economic theory of elections
by J. Davis & Louis Zincone - 73-87 Social welfare and electoral competition in democratic societies
by Melvin Hinich & Peter Ordeshook - 89-99 The paradox of revolution
by Gordon Tullock - 101-105 Why do high income people participate more in politics?
by Bruno Frey - 107-110 A note on administrative behavior and public policy
by James Weatherby - 111-122 Reviews
by Burton Weisbrod & Harold Hochman & Joe Hulett & Richard Wagner & Gordon Tullock
March 1971, Volume 10, Issue 1
- 1-19 On political competition, economic policy, and income maintenance programs
by Hirschel Kasper - 21-40 Ideology, public approval, and government behavior
by Lawrence Lau & Bruno Frey - 41-60 A note on uniform election processes as Riemann-Stieltjes integrals
by B. Meek - 61-80 Politics and the initiation of economic development
by Adam Przeworski & Martin Zechman - 81-92 An organizational model of the market
by Paul Roberts - 93-96 A “taxpayers' revolution” and economic rationality
by Raymond Jackson - 97-101 A note on condorcet sets
by I. Good - 103-108 Pressure groups and public investment decisions: A note
by David Shapiro - 109-117 Reviews
by James Buchanan & Robert Wallace & Mark Pauly
September 1970, Volume 9, Issue 1
- 1-18 Some institutional considerations in federal-state fiscal relations
by Kenneth Greene - 19-30 Revelation of preference for a public good with imperfect exclusion
by Morton Kamien & Nancy Schwartz - 31-37 An oligopoly model of political market structures
by James Lindeen - 39-51 The costs of decision-making
by Alex Michalos - 53-65 Cores and clubs
by Mark Pauly - 67-78 Political economy of the military draft
by Robert Tollison - 79-84 On homo politicus and the instant referendum
by Martin Shubik - 85-92 The economics of insurgency
by William Niskanen - 93-101 Book reviews
by Thomas Borcherding & Mark Sproule-Jones & Bryan Ellickson & Donald Escarraz & Thomas Ireland
March 1970, Volume 8, Issue 1
- 1-28 Lewis Carroll and the Cambridge mathematical school of P.R.; Arthur Cohen and Edith Denman
by Duncan Black - 29-43 Notes for an Economic theory of socialism
by James Buchanan - 45-61 The benefits of coalition
by James Coleman - 63-74 On the incidence of income redistribution
by J. Davis - 75-90 Coalitions, minority representation, and vote-trading probabilities
by Edwin Haefele - 91-100 The occurrence of the paradox of voting in University elections
by Richard Niemi - 101-110 The welfare effects of zero pricing of public goods
by Joseph Seneca - 111-115 Reviews
by Thomas Ireland & Daniel Newlon & Robert Tollison
September 1969, Volume 7, Issue 1
- 1-2 “Public choice and the grants economy: The intersecting set”
by Kenneth Boulding - 3-21 Income redistribution and social choice: A pragmatic approach
by A. Freeman - 23-31 The calculus of philanthropy
by Thomas Ireland - 33-45 The political economy of patronal groups
by Gerald Garvey - 47-63 The paradox of voting: Some probabilistic results
by Leon Gleser - 65-80 Some notes on voting schemes and the will of the majority
by Bernard Grofman - 81-106 Abstentions and equilibrium in the electoral process
by Melvin Hinich & Peter Ordeshook - 107-113 A program for direct and proxy voting in the legislative process
by James Miller - 115-121 Reviews
by Charles Goetz & Mark Pauly & Richard Kihlstrom
March 1969, Volume 6, Issue 1
- 1-17 Operational federalism: Organization for the provision of public services in the American federal system
by Vincent Ostrom - 19-29 Federalism: Problems of scale
by Gordon Tullock - 31-37 Two propositions on the optimum level of producing collective goods
by Yoram Barzel - 39-58 A normative theory of transfers
by Edgar Olsen - 59-70 Education for majority voting?
by John Owen - 71-92 Candidate selection and voting behavior in France
by Howard Rosenthal & Subrata Sen - 93-98 A note on “graph-theoretic approaches to the theory of social choice”
by George Lady - 99-101 A note on a cyclical majority problem
by David Klingaman - 103-104 Charitable exploitation
by Wilson Schmidt - 105-114 Reviews
by Kenneth Arrow & Roger Sherman
September 1968, Volume 5, Issue 1
- 1-17 A public choice approach to public utility pricing (1)
by James Buchanan - 19-37 Models of the working of a two-party electoral system Part II
by David Chapman - 39-58 The marginal utility of a vote commitment
by James Coleman - 59-72 On the power and importance of the mean preference in a mathematical model of democratic choice
by Otto Davis & Melvin Hinich - 73-85 Participatory democracy in the community action program
by Madelyn Kafoglis - 87-104 Some postulated effects of learning on constitutional behavior
by Elinor Ostrom - 105-107 Note on a Pareto-optimal decision process
by Mary Eysenbach - 109-112 A Pareto optimal group decision process: A reply
by Earl Thompson - 113-120 An estimate of import surplus under a disequilibrium system
by Donald Huddle - 121-124 Public finance textbooks: A view from political science
by William Mitchell - 125-129 Reviews
by J. Davis & Lawrence Officer
March 1968, Volume 4, Issue 1
- 3-17 Economic analysis of the non-profit institution — The case of the private university
by Ferdinand Levy - 19-33 Economic growth in a democracy: A model
by Bruno Frey - 35-47 Graph-theoretic approaches to the theory of social choice
by Michael Taylor - 49-58 Potential costs of alternative decision-making rules
by Herbert Kiesling - 59-66 Riker's method for assessing the significance of roll call votes
by William Yohe - 67-79 Do freely competitive markets misallocate charity? A comment on Tullock's analysis
by Earl Thompson & Gordon Tullock - 81-88 Review
by Richard Wagner & James Buchanan
January 1967, Volume 3, Issue 1
- 1-17 The central argument in Lewis Carroll's The Principles of Parliamentary Representation
by Duncan Black - 19-37 Models of the working of a two-party electoral system — I
by David Chapman - 39-47 Should “public goods” be public?
by Francesco Forte - 49-66 The rationale of revolt
by Thomas Ireland - 67-83 The peculiar economics of disaster
by Howard Kunreuther - 85-90 A utility analysis of post-disaster co-operation
by Louis Alessi - 91-92 On paradigms in political science and economics
by Lewis Froman - 93-96 The Rand-Parkinson effect
by Gordon Tullock - 97-105 Book review
by Gordon Tullock & Louis Alessi & Joseph Spengler & Mark Pauley
December 1967, Volume 2, Issue 1
- 1-10 Fiscal policy and fiscal preference
by James Buchanan - 11-26 Ethics and game theory: The prisoner's dilemma
by R. Cunningham - 27-44 Constitutional asymmetry
by David Tuerck - 45-59 A method for finding “acceptable proposals” in group decision processes
by Charles Plott - 61-70 Alternative voting rules and local expenditure: The town-meeting vs. city
by Harvey Wheeler - 71-89 A rational theory of the federal budgeting process
by Oliver Williamson - 91-101 A note on supplemental appropriations in the federal budgetary process
by Gary Bowman & Otto Davis & Henry Gailliot & Alan Hess - 103-104 Review
by Roger Sherman - 105-118 Bibliography of recent works in non-market decision making
by Mark Pauly
December 1966, Volume 1, Issue 1
- 1-1 Preface
by Gordon Tullock - 1-48 A simple theory of non-cooperative games with ordinal utilities (1)
by Duncan Black - 49-62 Individual interests and collective action
by James Coleman - 63-132 On the process of budgeting: An empirical study of congressional appropriation
by Otto Davis & M. Dempster & Aaron Wildavsky - 133-140 A pareto optimal group decision process
by E. Thompson - 141-159 Information without profit
by Gordon Tullock - 161-170 Pressure groups and political entrepreneurs: A review article
by Richard Wagner